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1. SU~Y~etr ar~s that an ae[fai O~e~vation ~~ 
without visual aides of marihuana plants in resp's fenced-in ~.~-
~~~ 
b~ by a police officer flying in an airplane at 1,000  ~~ ~ 
feet did not violate the 4th Amend. Petr also argues that ~
evidence obtained in a search of resp's premises pursuant to a ~. 
C!r~ j >S~ f7v'.O rnJb 1 · , 
~~;.,~~~ 
warrant based on the aerial observation was admissible under 
the good faith doctrine of United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 
3405 (1984). 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: A Santa Clara police 
officer received an anonymous phone message that marihuana 
plants were seen growing in the backyard of a house later 
identified as belonging to resp. The officer initially walked 
by the house, but was unable to see anything because his view 
was blocked by a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence . 
. _______....__ 
The officer then undertook an airplane flight with the express 
purpose of observing and photographing the backyard. From an 
altitude of 1,000 feet and without visual aides, the officer 
observed and photographed a marihuana garden in resp's 
backyard. Based on this information, the officer obtained a 
search warrant for resp's home. The ensuing search yielded 
~-·~
the marihuana plants growing in the backyard. 
The TC denied resp's suppression motion, but the Cal. 
App. reversed on interlocutory appeal. At that court's 
request, the parties addressed the possible applicability of 
Leon. The court concluded, however, that Leon did not apply 
to warrantless searches such as the aerial surveillance. If 
that search violated the 4th Amend., evidence obtained during 
that search could not be used to support a search warrant. 
Without this evidence, the warrant in question was not 
supported by probable cause. The court reasoned that nothing 
in Leon undercut the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The court noted that the 
continued vitality of the doctrine that evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant based on facts obtained from a prior 
unlawful search would be suppressible was implicitly 
recognized in Segura v. United States, 104 s.ct. 3380 (1984), 
decided the same day as Leon. 
The court next examined the legality of the aerial 
'\.\ . ./ 
-Jl !.--"'" 
observation. It read the open fields doctrine of Oliver v. 
United States, 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984), as not extending to the 
"curtilage," or "the land immediately surrounding arid 
associated with the home." Id., at 1742. It then reasoned 
--------------that under the principles of Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 
347 (1967), resp had a reasonable ectation of privacy in 
his fenced-in backyard. 
The court noted the statement in Oliver that both parties 
"concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands 
from the air." 104 S.Ct., at 1741 (fn. omitted). But it 
distinguished the two cases cited by this Court in connection 
with that statement, see id., at n.9: United States v. Allen, 
675 F.2d 1373 (CA9 1980) involved a 200-acre ranch on the 
coast subject to regular Coast Guard helicopter overflights 
for law enforcement and other reasons; United States v. 
DeBacker, 493 F.Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980), involved a 
flight over open fields on the defendant's farm. Neither case 
involved overflight surveillance of the 9urtilage, and the 
court in each case found no reasonable expectation of privacy 





732 F.2d 390, 398 (CAS 1984) (overflight of "plainly 
noncurtilage portions" of large commercial gravel pit). 
Citing heavily to language in Oliver and the .cases cited 
therein, the Cal. App. reasoned that 4th Amend. expectations 
of privacy extend to the curtilage surrounding a private - - ----·~
dwelling. The court considered it significant that the flight 
was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing resp's 
enclosed backyard, and was not a routine overflight for any 
other legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose. It 
cited language in Allen to the effect that a homeowner need 
not construct an opaque bubble over his yard to preserve his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it. 
Accordingly, the court held the aerial surveillance to be 
an unconstitutional search, and that the information gathered 
in that search could not be used to support the search warrant 
for resp's premises. The court noted that it was relying on 
the federal constitution and was not reaching petr's 
contentions based on the Cal. Canst. 
The Cal. Sup. Ct. denied discretionary review, with 
Lucas, J., voting to grant. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first argues that a physically 
nonintrusive observation of a readily seen object in a fenced-
in yard from a plane in navigable airspace is not a 4th Amend. 
search. Petr claims that the marihuana plants were 8-10 feet 
high and could be readily identified by their size, height and 
distinctive color. Petr notes that Oliver did not define the l---
/~ 
scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine, 
and claims that this Court has never extended the 4th Amend. 
"to preclude visual observation from public places of readily 
discernible items on particular premises." Navigable airspace 
is such a public place. Petr argues that society is not 
~~ 
prepared to recognize a right of privacy from such 
observations. Moreover, it is impossible in practice for an 
airborne officer to distinguish between curtilage and 
noncurtilage when both are readily visible. Officers will 
have to guess where one begins and the other ends and whether 
a fence encloses open fields or curtilage. 
Petr next argues that the Cal. App. unduly limited Leon. 
Petr would extend the good faith exception to a situation in 
which the police seized evidence in good faith reliance on a 
warrant where a fully informed magistrate found probable cause 
~ supported by evidence he reasonably believed was obtained 
lawfully, notwithstanding a subsequent contrary ruling. Petr 
contends that when the police inform the magistrate of the 
circumstances under which they learned the evidence supporting 
probable cause, the "magistrate's warrant is an implicit 
judicial determination that probable cause was obtained 
constitutionally. If that appraisal is subsequently 
overturned, when it was reasonable under the law at the time, 
the officer seizing property under the warrant stands in 
identical relation to the Fourth Amendment as the officer in 
Leon." 
Resp follows the reasoning of the Cal. App., relying 
heavily on the distinction made in Oliver between open fields 
and curtilage. Resp stresses that this case involves a 
"focused scrutiny" of resp's home from the air and not an 
observation during a routine patrol or an otherwise accidental 
observation. Resp argues that it would be inconsistent with 
our Constitutional traditions and unhealthy to require 
citizens to construct opague bubbles over their backyards to 
secu t t~ their privacy from airborne police surveillance. 
Resp rebuts the argument that the curtilage distinction 
does not provide meaningful guidance in practice during aerial 
surveillance by pointing to language in Oliver that "for most 
homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; 
and the conception defining the curtilage--as the area around 
the home to which the acitivity of home life extends--is a 
familiar one easily understood from our daily experience." 
~ 104 s.ct., at 1743 n.l2. 
Resp also points to the reasoning in United States v. 
Karo, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984), that the police could not do 
indirectly by surreptitiously arranging for a "beeper" to be 
taken into a house what they could not do directly by a 
warrantless entry to plant such a device. Similarly, in this 
case the agents could not have physically invaded the backyard 
without a warrant because the open fields doctrine does not 
apply to the curtilage, hence they could not achieve the same 
result indirectly by an overflight. 
Resp next argues that this is not a good case to reach 
the Leon issue. He interprets petr's argument as requesting 
that Leon be extended to good faith warrantless searches 
subsequently held to be unconstitutional. He claims that no 
record was made in the TC on the officer's objective good 
faith, as the Leon issue was first raised by the .cal. App. 
For the reasons given in Illinois v. Gates, 462 u.s. 213 
(1983), for not reaching the good faith issue on an incomplete 
record, this Court should also decline to reach it in this 
case. At \ le time the warrant was executed, the legality of 
an aerial surveillance was at least an open issue under 
federal and California law. 
Resp next argues that the good faith position urged by 
petr would conflict with the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine of Wong Sun and Segura. There would be no point in 
obeying the 4th Amend. if illegally obtained evidence could be 
used to obtain a search warrant on which a police officer 
could then rely in good faith. The magistrate ruling ex parte 
without benefit of cross-examination or argument is not in a 
position to rule on the legality of the means used by the 
police to obtain the evidence offered to show probable cause 
for a warrant. 
Petr's reply brief cites a preliminary injunction granted 
by the N.D.Cal. in Norml v. Mullen, No. 83-4037 RPA (1985), as 
modified by the CA9, No. 85-1883 (April 19, 1985), enjoining 
"deliberate, knowing and intentional helicopter flights under 
500 feet over residential structures, persons and vehicles" 
for surveillance. Apparently the injunction does not apply to 
fixed wing aircraft. Petr asserts that the Cal. App.'s 
decision in the instant case would effectively prohibit aerial 
observations permitted by the N.D.Cal. 
Petr also argues that the record is sufficient to rule on 
the Leon issue because the issue was decided by the lower 
court and subjective good faith of the police officer is not 
at issue. 
In an amicus Jtle t , the Appellate Committee of the 
California District Attorneys Association asks this Court to 
clarify the confusion surrounding ~~rflights by polic;J It 
cites United States v. Bassford, 601 F.Supp. 1324 (D.Me. 
1985) , which applies a case-by-case approach to uphold an 
overflight, and argues that such an approach was condemned in 
Oliver. The Committee also argues that by making no attempt 
to conceal his marihuana crop from aerial observation resp 
~ exhibited no expectation of privacy. It further argues by 
analogy to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that the aerial 
observation, if a search, was not an unreasonable one. 
Finally, the Committee argues that the principle of Leon 
applies to this case. All the facts were presented to the 
magistrate, who by signing the warrant implicitly determined 
that the facts supporting the warrant were lawfully obtained. 
Excluding the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant because 
an appellate court subsequently states a new proposition of 
law would not serve any useful deterrent or remedial purpose. 
4. DISCUSSION: The concern in Oliver was with physical _..., 
intrusion by the police onto private property and whether that 
alone amounted to an infringement of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy protected by the 4th Amend. In concluding that it 
did not if open fields were involved, this Court drew a limit 
at the curtilage of a dwelling. Oliver did not deal with a 
-----~ 
situation in which the police, located in a place where they 
were lawfully present, could see contraband in plain view. 
This is not a case where advanced technology spy equipment was 
used to conduct the ·vis 11 ,~ ~yuivalent of electronic 
eavesdropping. Cf., United States v. Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252 
(D.Ha. 1976) (FBI agents used 800 mm. telescope with a 60 mm. 
opening to observe from a quarter mile away what was occurring 
in defendant's apartment, including the contents of documents 
he was reading). In some respects, it is really no different 
than if the police could see over resp's two fences from the 
roof of a neighboring building. On the other hand, where 
~ there are no neighboring structures that offer a vantage point 
to peer into a fenced-in backyard, our society probably does 
recognize a greater expectation of privacy in a backyard for 
such lawful activities as sunbathing. The question is whether 
this expectation carries over to unlawful activities in the 
same way that the privacy of the interior of a home does. 
The good faith claim would cover this case only if the /r 
Court wants to expand Leon significantly. Leon dealt with 
differing reasonable evaluations of what amount of evidence 
constitutes probable cause. The police attempted to follow 
the law in that case by seeking a warrant. The magistrate 
simply misjudged the evidence. In the instant case, the 
police acted unilaterally by conducting the aerial 
surveillance without first obtaining a warrant to do so. Even 
if the subsequent issuing of a warrant is taken as approving 
the lawfulness of the overflight, that determination is after 
the fact. I think the Cal. App. was correct in concluding 
that nothing in Leon purported to cut back on the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. 
I recommend a grant limi a ~u question #1 (the 
lawfulness of aerial observation). 
Resp seeks IFP status, and his affidavit shows no 
significant resources. 
There is a response, a reply, and an amicus brief. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell December 9, 1985 
.From: Anne 
No. 84-1513, California v. Ciraolo 
(cert. to Cal. Ct. App.) (argument December 10, 1985) 
Question Presented 
Is police observation from aircraft of a fenced 
residential yard a "search" within the meaning of the .Fourth 
Amendment? 
Background 
This case arose out of a warrantless overflight by 
police of resp 's back yard. Pol ice officer Shu tz received an 
anonymous phone message that marijuana plants were growing in the 
back yard of a home, later identified as resp's residence. Shutz 
went to the house on foot and conducted a ground level 
'. 
. . 2 • 
investigation. He was unable to see into resp's back yard 
because two fences completely enclosed the yard; the outer fence 
was six-feet high, and an inner fence was ten-feet high. 1 That 
same day, Shutz took an airplane flight for the purpose of -observing and photographing the portion of resp's yard that was 
enclosed by the fence. The plane was flown at an altitude of 
~10~ Without visual aids, S~erved marijuana growing 
in resp 's back yard. Shutz also took photographs of the yard· 
Based on the information obtained in the overflight, Shutz 
obtained a warrant to search resp's home. Upon execution of the 
warrant, marijuana plants were discovered growing in the yard and 
seized. 
Resp was indicted on drug charges. Arguing that the 
aerial surveillance violated his reasonable expectation of 
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, resp moved to suppress 
the marijuana plants. The TC denied the motion, and resp was 
convicted. On appeal, resp argued that the TC erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the plants. The California Court of 
Appeal for the First Appellate District agreed and reversed 
resp's conviction. 
The court initially concluded that the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. 
1 This description of resp's yard is taken from the opinion of 
the California court. Though the State claims that such 
description is in some respects inaccurate, the State concedes 
that a portion of the fence was ten-feet tall and blocked visual 
observation from th~t. 
~
. . 3 • 
Leon, 104 s.ct. 3405 (1984), would not apply if the search 
w:1rrant was secured on facts obtained from an unlawful search. 2 
Then, the court considered the lawfulness of the aerial 
surveillance, which supplied the evidence to support issuance of 
~ the search warrant. Cal. Ct. App. placed primary reliance on 
~ 
your opinion for the Court in Oliver v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 
1735 (1984), which reaffirmed the "open fields" doctrine of 
Hester v. United States, 265 u.s. 57 (1924). In the view of Cal. 
Ct. App., Oliver made clear that the curtilage was entitled to 
the '"right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment."' Pet. 
for Cert. at A 12 (quoting Oliver, supra, at 1741). The court 
mted that Oliver contained the statement that the parties had 
oonceded that "'the public and police lawfully may survey lands 
from the air.'" Id. at 14 (quoting Oliver, supra, at 1741). By 
examining the cases that Oliver cited for that proposition, the 
oourt concluded that the language referred to aerial surveillance 
of open fields, not of the curtilage. The court found that 
resp's back yard was "within the curtilage; the height and 
existence of the two fences constitute objective criteria from 
which we may conclude he manifested a reasonable expectation of 
privacy by any standard." Ultimately, the court held that the 
aerial surveillance, which was undertaken for "the specific 
purpose of observing this particular enclosure with in [ resp 's] 
curtilage," constituted an unreasonable search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
2 In granting cert., this Court declined to review the 
California court's decision about the reach of Leon. 
. ' 4 . 
California Supreme Court denied review, over the dissent 
of one judge. 
Discussion 
In Oliver, the Court held that government intrusion on 
was not a 8 Search 8 within the meaning of the Fourth 
The Court reached this conclusion by examining 
several factors. First, open fields were not within the explicit 
language of the Fourth Amendment, which extends to npersons, 
houses, papers, and effects. n Second, open fields were not an 
area in which a person could legitimately claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy because they 8 do not provide the setting 
for those intimate activi ties 8 that the Fourth Amendment is 
designed 8 tO shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.n 104 s.ct. at 1741. Finally, the Court noted that 
a general rule with respect to intrusion on open fields was 
desirable to accommodate the needs of law enforcement and Fourth 
Amendment interests. Accordingly, the Court declined to adopt an 
8 ad hoc approachn that would require police to evaluate the 
measures taken by a citizen to preserve his privacy in open 
fields. Since government intrusion on open fields did not 
infringe 8 Upon the personal and societal values protected by the 
Fourth Amendment,n such intrusion was not a search within the 
meaning of the Amendment. 
Oliver left open the questions of 8 the scope of the 
curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine [and] the degree 
of Fourth Amendment curtilage, as opposed 
to the home itself.n !d. n. 11. This case requires the Court to 
5. 
consider those questions. Assuming that the Court decides that 
resp's back yard was within the "curtilage" and that it was 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, the Court then is faced 
with a difficult question: Does a person lose his legitimate 9 
expectation of privacy in an activity because the activity can be 
observed from the public airspace? Though the question is close 
and may not receive the same answer in all contexts, I hope that 
it is answered in this case in the negative. As 1 will attempt 
to demonstrate, 1 believe that the result 1 recommend is 
consistent with the framework of Oliver. 
First, it is necessary to look to the text of the Fourth ---Jmendment. Obviously, the word "curtilage" does not appear 
there. But the language of the Amendment shows that protection 
is I believe that the textual inquiry 
at this point must focus on whether the protection accorded to 
"houses" extends to the curtilage. Oliver suggests that it 
should. Oliver explains that, at common law, 
the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with 
the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' !d. 
at 1742 u.s. 616, 630 
(1886)). Therefore, the curtilage "has been considered part of 
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." !d. Oliver further 
observed that lower courts have given Fourth Amendment protection 
to the curtilage and have defined the curtilage "by reference to 
the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may 
expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private. n ld. Thus, the reasoning and language of Oliver 
•, 
6. 
strongly suggest that the word "houses" in the Fourth Amendment 
encompasses some concept of "curtilage." 
Second, it is necessary to decide if the curtilage 
·-- -------·------
encompasses resp's back yard. In Oliver, the Court cited lower 
--------- --~ 
court opinions that had defined "curtilage" by reference to 
"factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may 
expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private." ld. One of the cases cited, United States v. Van 
Q¥ke, 643 F.2d 992 (CA4 1981), noted that the curtilage has been 
defined as "'an area of domestic use immediately surrounding a 
dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with a dwelling.'" 
ld • at 9 9 3 n . 1. In Van Dyke, CA4 declined to adopt a per se 
rule based on distance from the home. CA4 then decided that 
police had intruded on the curtilage when they climbed an 
exclusionary fence and lay down in a honeysuckle patch located 
about 150 feet from the residence. Another decision cited in 
Oliver, Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (CA10), cert. denied, 
351 u.s. 932 (1956), concluded that a cave located "in a plowed 
field, across a road and more than a long city block from the 
home" was not in the curtilage. CAlO stated that whether "the 
place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from 
the facts, including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, 
its inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the 
dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic 
economy of the family." !d. at 25. Based on these definitions, 
t<- \.\ 
I believe that resp' s back yard can fairly be characterized as 
part of the curtilage. 
~
While it will be necessary to examine 
7. 
the photos taken by police of the yard, it appears that the yard 
'-" --~ 
was adjacent to the home. The yard was enclosed. Since the yard - ------------
contained a pool and patio, it clearly was an area in which 
private, family activities could be expected to occur. 
Third, it is necessary to decide if resp had a 
) 11 . . \\ b . 
eg1t1mate expectation of privacy in the yard. I el1eve that he~-
did. He made an effort to protect his privacy from the view of 
the public~ ~ing a fence over which even tall people co~~ 
In Oliver, the Court set out several factors to~ rot see. 
.._/ 
consider in deciding if an expectation of privacy is 
"legitimate." First, the intention of the Framers must be 
Jl 
considered. Since Oliver demonstrates that the curtilage was 
oonsidered a private area at common law, citing 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 225, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that 
the curtilage was within the contemplation of the Framers. 
Second, the uses to which an individual has put a location are 
relevant. Here, it seems that resp 's back yard was used for 
private, domestic activities, and back yards generally are used 
for family gatherings. Third, it is necessary to consider "our 
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most 
~rupulous protection from governmental invasion." 104 s.ct. at 
1741. In this connection, the Court in Oliver pointed out that a 
person's home has always been considered an enclave of privacy, 
See Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573 (1980), and used language 
suggesting that the curtilage is part of the home. For me, this 
third factor is crucial in this case. I believe that society 
recognizes that persons have an interest in maintaining the 
8. 
privacy of activities conducted in their back yards, particularly 
where the individual has made a reasonable effort to shield his 
yard from view. 
A difficult question arises at this point for the State 
argues that citizens do not have legitimate expectations of 
privacy in areas exposed to the view of people passing over in 
....___ .. -----
airplanes. Since the police had a legal right to be in the 
public air space from which they viewed the yard, the State urges 
you to view this case as no different from that in which an 
officer walking past a home observed evidence of crime in a yard 
open to view from the street. My own feeling is that a 
resident's expectation of privacy in a yard that he had taken 
steps to protect from the gaze of passersby should not be 
diminished merely because of the possibility that some member of 
the public flying over in an airplane might happen to look down 
and observe him. Certainly, the risk of that intrusion is very 0~ 
different from the type of delibera~police intr~s flected tf 
on the facts . ;f~his case. 3 In short, I am troubled by the 
,.,...___ - - -· -..__ 
thought that police are entitled to fly over people's homes and 
take photographs of activities conducted in their enclosed back 
yards. I believe that such official activity represents a real 
3 1 believe that my recommendation is consistent with the 
statement in Oliver concerning aerial surveillance of "lands." 
That statement was used in the course of discussing surveillance 
of "open fields," an area in which individuals do not harbor 
legitimate expectations of privacy even as to police intrusion on 
the ground. Here, on the other hand, I believe that resp did 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his yard. 
- 9. 
encroachment on privacy. Moreover, if the Court approves the 
type of police surveillance that occurred in this case, the 
historical protection of the curtilage would be destroyed. 
Fourth, if you agree that resp had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his yard, it is necessary to decide if 
the police conduct in this case intruded on that privacy. I 
think that it did so intrude. Petr-State argues, among other 
things, that the police activity did not intrude because the 
officer did not physically enter the yard. This argument ignores 
this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which has rejected 
the notion that a "search" occurs only if the government 
physically intrudes on an area. See United States v. Knotts, 460 
u.s. 276, 280 (1983); Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 353 
(1967). Instead, the inquiry is whether the government invaded a 
person's reasonable or legitimate privacy interest. My own view 
is that aerial surveillance of a back yard that is closely 
associated with a home, that is used for private activities, and 
that has been enclosed to shut out the gaze of people passing by 
is very intrusive. 
Petr-State argues that United States v. Knotts, supra, 
supports its position that the aerial surveillance did not 
constitute a search. In Knotts, the Court upheld warrantless use 
cl a "beeper" to track a drum of chemicals from the seller to its 
ultimate destination in the buyer's yard. The Court decided that 
the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the officers to enhance 
their sensory faculties with the beeper and pointed that simple 
visua surveillance from the public road or premises adjoining 
10. 
the buyer's home would have revealed to police the same 
---~~-~---., 
--------------~~-------------~ information revealed by the beeper. But, in my view, it is -------------- ·-· 
critical that Knotts did not involve use of a beeper to intrude 
into a private area. The Court explicitly stated that there was 
no indication that the beeper was used to reveal information 
about the movement of the drum inside the buyer's cabin "or in 
any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from 
outside the cabin." ld. at 285. In this case, on the other 
hand, the police used a surveillance technique designed to 
heighten their ordinary powers of observation, and they used that 
technique to peer into a private area. 
Moreover, in United States v. Karo, 104 S.Ct. 3296 
(1984), the Court held that monitoring of a beeper in a private 
residence did fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court pointed out in Karo that, if an agent had surreptitiously 
and without a warrant entered the residence to determine if the 
drum of chemicals was inside, he would have engaged in an 
unreasonable search. In the Court's view, the result should be 
the same where the government "surreptitiously employs an 
electronic device to obtain information that it could not have 
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house." 
The Court acknowledged that monitoring of a beeper was less 
intrusive than a full scale search, but the technique did "reveal 
a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the 
Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could 
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant." Because I 
. ~ 11. 
believe that resp's back yard was a private area, this case 
implicates, for me, similar concerns. 
Finally, I acknowledge again that the question presented 
is close. My recommendation is influenced by my belief that 
privacy interests associated with the home are precious and 
should not be strictly limited to activities that occur inside 
the walls of the home. I believe that the Fourth Amendment 
protections should extend to the physical area directly 
associated with the home. I also believe that police aerial 
surveillance represents a significant threat to person's privacy 
interests in their home. But I can understand that you might 
vote to balance the interests in a different manner. 
Conclusion 
I recommend that you affirm the decision of the 
California court that the aerial surveillance of resp 's home 
consituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
if'v-
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Disposition: Affirm 
Discussion: 
Because I believe that the aerial surveillance of respond-
ent's backyard constituted a warrantless "search" of his proper-
ty, I would affirm. 
In Oliver, we recognized that an individual may legitimately 
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in the area 
immediately surrounding the home. In this case, because the par-
ties agree that the police searched the area immediately sur-
rounding his home, respondent was entitled to a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. This expectation was reinforced by the exten-
sive measures he undertook to maintain his privacy. Respondent 
surrounded his property with a fence, and apart from covering it 
with an opaque dome, there was nothing more he could do to pro-
teet his privacy. The police circumvented respondent's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy by observing his property from the 
air. To allow the police to engage in this type of surveillance 
would effectively eliminate any privacy interest in the area sur-
rounding the home. Because of this, I cannot understand how the 
aerial surveillance that took place here can be considered any-
thing but a "search" of respondent's property. 
The police would certainly have conducted a "search" of re-
spondent's property if they had set a ladder up next to his fence 
and looked over into his backyard. To my mind, the situation 
- 2 -
here is no different. In both cases, the police surveillance is 
meant to circumvent the individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy. And in both cases, the fact that the property could 
have been viewed from the air by the public should not detract 
from the individual's legitimate privacy concerns. 
To put the issue before us in perspective, I do not believe 
that the government should never be allowed to engage in aerial 
surveillance of curtilage areas. I would merely hold that the 
use of aerial surveillance to observe what is otherwise hidden 
from view constitutes a "search" implicating Fourth Amendment 
concerns. This would subject the government's use of aerial sur-
veillance to judicial scrutiny, and would protect both the indi-
vidual's strong privacy interests and the government's interest 
in effective law enforcement. 
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Dear Chief: 
February 22, 1986 
84-1259 Dow Chemical v. United States 
84-1513 California v . Ciraolo 
In due time, I will circulate dissents in these 
cases. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief: Ju~tice 
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February 24, 1986 
Re: 84-1513 California v. Ciraolo 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
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February 26, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1513 California v. Cirao1o 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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March 3, 1986 
84-1513 - California v. Ciraolo 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
,,/,. 
The Chief Justice 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 6, 1986 
Re: 84-1513 - California v. Ciraolo 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
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lfp/ss 04/17/86 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Anne DATE: April 17, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-1513 California v. Ciraolo 
This is being dictated as I read your revised 
draft of April 16. 
1. Part I, Part II and Part III are excellent 
(p. 1-11) My editing has been light. 
2. Now that I have read Parts IV and V, I agree 
that they also are excellent. I have done some editing. 
Also, subject to your thinking, I prefer Rider A, p. 15, 
attached to the language on pp. 15-16 that I suggest we 
emit. My new footnote 8 also is important. 
• I 
' < 
I also am inclined to omit footnote 7. There are 
so many possible hypotheticals such as use of a firetruck 
ladder, climbing a tree, observing a neighbor's back yard 
from the second floor window of a nearby residence. I am 
inclined to leave the Chief with his hypotheticals. They 
do not undercut our basic rationale that you have stated 
so very well. 
Unless you have different views, I suggest we 
move promptly to have a co-clerk cite check our draft, and 
then to a printed chambers draft. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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CIR15 SALLY-POW 
Commercial flights, as well as private planes used for 
business or personal reasons, normally fly at altitudes 
from which occupants of these planes could obtain at most 
an anonymous and non-discriminating glimpse of the 
landscape and buildings over which they pass. 8 The 
purpose of a flight over ones's residence is a relevant if 
not controlling fact. People do not travel by air or for 
pleasure for the purpose of observing the activities that 
may take place within residential curtilages. Here, 
apparently without making any effort to obtain a warrant, 
this overflight at low altitude was conducted solely for 
the purpose of discovering evidence of crime within a 
2. 
private enclave into which these police were 
constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level. 
8. Of course, during takeoffs and landings 
planes briefly are at low enough altitudes to afford 
fleeting opportunities to observe some types of activity 
in the curtilages of residents who live between the 
strictly regulated takeoff and landing flight zones. As 
all of us know from personal experience, at least in 
passenger aircrafts, there rarely - if ever - is an 
opportunity for a practical observation and photographing 
of unlawful activity similar to that obtained by Officer 
Shultz in this case. The Court's analogy to commercial 
and private overlights is wholly without merit. 
04/24 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: 1986 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1513 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CIRAOLO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), 
Justice Harlan warned that any decision to construe the 
Fourth Amendment as proscribing only physical intrusions 
by police onto private property "is, in the present day, bad 
physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical inva-
sion." I d., at 362. Because the Court today ignores that 
warning in an opinion that departs significantly from the 
standard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, I dissent. 
I 
As the Court's opinion reflects, the facts of this case are 
not complicated. Officer Shutz investigated an anonymous 
report that marijuana was growing in the backyard of re-
spondent's home. A tall fence prevented Shutz from looking 
into the yard from the street. The yard was directly behind 
the home so that the home itself furnished one border of the 
fence. Shutz proceeded, without obtaining a warrant, to 
charter a plane and fly over the home at an altitude of 1,000 
feet. Observing marijuana plants growing in the fenced-in 
yard, Shutz photographed respondent's home and yard, as 
well as homes and yards of neighbors. The photograph 
clearly shows that the enclosed yard contained a small swim-
ming pool and patio. Shutz then filed an affidavit, to which 
84-1513-DISSENT 
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he attached the photograph, describing the anonymous tip 
and his aerial observation of the marijuana. A warrant is-
sued, 1 and a search of the yard confirmed Shutz's aerial ob-
servations. Respondent was arrested for cultivating mari-
juana, a felony under California law. 
Respondent contends that the police intruded on his con-
stitutionally protected expectation of privacy when they con-
ducted aerial surveillance of his home and photographed his 
backyard without first obtaining a warrant. The Court re-
jects that contention, holding that respondent's expectation 
of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reasonable as 
to intrusions on the ground, was unreasonable as to surveil-
lance from the navigable air space. In my view, the Court's 
holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that the air 
space generally is open to all persons for travel in airplanes. 
The Court does not explain why this single fact deprives citi-




The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." While the 
familiar history of the Amendment need not be recounted 
here, 2 we should remember that it reflects a choice that our 
society should be one in which citizens "dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v. United 
States , 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Since that choice was made 
by the Framers of the Constitution, our cases construing the 
Fourth Amendment have relied in part on the common law 
for instruction on "what sorts of searches the Framers . . . 
' The warrant authorized Shutz to search the home and its attached ga-
rage , as well as the yard, for marijuana, narcotics paraphernalia, records 
relating to marijuana sales , and documents identifying the occupant of the 
premises. 
2 See, e. g., Payton v. N ew York , 445 U.S. 573, 583-585, n. 20 (1980). 
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regarded as reasonable." Steagald v. United States, 451 
U. S. 204, 217 (1981). But we have repeatedly refused to 
freeze "'into constitutional law those enforcement practices 
that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's pas-
sage."' Id., at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 591, n. 33 (1980).. See United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Rather, we 
have construed the Amendment "'in light of contemporary 
norms and conditions,"' 451 U. S., at 217, n. 10, quoting 
Payton v. New York, supra, at 591, n. 33, in order to prevent 
"any stealthy encroachments" on our citizens' right to be free 
of arbitrary official intrusion, Boyd v. United States, 116 
U. S. 616, 635 (1886). Since the landmark decision in Katz 
v. United States, the Court has fulfilled its duty to protect 
Fourth Amendment rights by asking if police surveillance has 
intruded on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 
As the decision in Katz held, and dissenting opinions writ-
ten by Justices of this Court prior to Katz recognized, e. g., 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139-141 (1942) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U. S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), a standard 
that defines a Fourth Amendment "search" by reference to 
whether police have physically invaded a "constitutionally 
protected area" provides no real protection against surveil-
lance techniques made possible through technology. Tech-
nological advances have enabled police to see people's activi-
ties and associations, and to hear their conversations, 
without being in physical proximity. Moreover, the capabil-
ity now exists for police to conduct intrusive surveillance 
without any physical penetration of the walls of homes or 
other structures that citizens may believe shelters their pri-
vacy.3 Looking to the Fourth Amendment for protection 
3 As was said more than four decades ago: "[T]he search of one's home or 
office no longer requires physical entry for science has brought forth far 
more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct 
and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears 
84-1513-DISSENT 
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against such "broad and unsuspected governmental incur-
sions" into the "cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens," 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 
312-313 (footnote omitted), the Court in Katz abandoned its 
inquiry into whether police had committed a physical tres-
pass. Katz announced a standard under which the occur-
rence of a search turned not on the physical position of the 
police conducting the surveillance, but on whether the sur-
veillance in question had invaded a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Our decisions following the teaching of Katz illustrate that 
this inquiry "normally embraces two discrete questions." 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979). "The first is 
whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy."' Ibid., quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
The second is whether that subjective expectation "is 'one 
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."'" 
Ibid., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). While the Court today purports to re-
affirm this analytical framework, its conclusory rejection of 
respondent's expectation of privacy in the yard of his resi-
dence as one that "is unreasonable," ante, at 5, represents a 
turning away from the principles that have guided our 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Court's rejection of re-
spondent's Fourth Amendment claim is curiously at odds 
with its purported reaffirmation of the curtilage doctrine, 
both in this decision and its companion case, Dow Chemical 
and which inspired the Fourth Amendment. · ... Whether the search of 
private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls of the sanc-
tum a detectaphone that transmits to the outside listener the intimate de-
tails of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that pen-
etrate walls or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally 
invaded by the Government and intimate personal matters are laid bare to 
view." Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). Since 1942, science has developed far more sophisticated 
means of surveillance. 
84-1513-DISSENT 
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Co. v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1986), and particularly 
with its conclusion in Dow that expectations of privacy in the 
curtilage are legitimate. 
The second question under Katz has been described as ask-
ing whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate in the 
sense required by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U. S. 170, 182 (1984). The answer turns 
on "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id., at 182-183. While no single consideration has 
been regarded as dispositive, "the Court has given weight to 
such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, . . . the uses to which the individual has put a 
location, . . . and our societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from govern-
ment invasion." 4 /d., at 178 (citations omitted). Our deci-
sions have made clear that this inquiry often must be decided 
by "reference to a 'place,"' Katz v. United States, supra, at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S., at 589, and that a home is a place in which a subjective 
expectation of privacy virtually always will be legitimate, 
ibid.; see, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 
713-715 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., at 
211-212. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a [person] to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 
(1961). 
'"Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and per-
mitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 
(1978). This inquiry necessarily focuses on personal interests in privacy 
and liberty recognized by a free society. 
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B 
This case involves surveillance of a home, for as we stated 
in Oliver v. United States, the curtilage "has been considered 
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." 
466 U. S., at 180. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 
decided today, the Court reaffirms that the "curtilage doc-
trine evolved to protect much the same kind of privacy as 
that covering the interior of a structure." -- U. S., at 
--. The Court in Dow emphasizes, moreover, that society 
is prepared to accept as legitimate citizens' expectations of 
privacy in the area immediately surrounding their homes. 
Ibid. 
In deciding whether an area is within the curtilage, courts 
"have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refer-
ence to the factors that determine whether an individual rea-
sonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the 
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. Van 
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United 
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 
(1956)." Ibid. The lower federal courts have agreed that 
the curtilage is "an area of domestic use immediately sur-
rounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with 
the dwelling." 5 United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 
686, 692 (Md. 1967); see United States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 
993, n. 1. Those courts also have held that whether an area 
is within the curtilage must be decided by looking at all of the 
facts. Ibid., quoting Care v. United States, supra, at 25. 
Relevant facts include the proximity between the area 
claimed to be curtilage and the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident 
5 The Oxford English Dictionary defines curtilage as "a small court, 
yard, garth, or piece of ground attached to a dwelling-house, and forming 
one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and 
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings." 2 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 1278 (1933). 
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to protect the area from the curious glances of people passing 
by. See Care v. United States, supra, at 25; see also United 
States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 993-994. 
III 
A 
The Court begi~s its analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
issue posed here by deciding that respondent had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his backyard. I agree with that conclusion 
because of the close proximity of the yard to the house, the 
nature of some of the activities respondent conducted there, 6 
and because he had taken steps to shield those activities from 
the view of passersby. The Court then implicitly acknowl-
edges that society is prepared to recognize his expectation as 
legitimate with respect to ground-level surveillance, holding 
that the yard was within the curtilage, an area in which 
privacy interests have been afforded the "most heightened" 
protection. Ante, at 5. As the foregoing discussion of the 
curtilage doctrine demonstrates, respondent's yard unques-
tionably was within the curtilage. Since Officer Shutz could 
not see into this private family area from the street, the 
Court certainly would agree that he would have conducted an 
unreasonable search had he climbed over the fence, or used a 
ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a warrant. 
See United States v. Van Dyke, supra; United States v. Wil-
liams, supra. 
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that Shutz could use an 
airplane-a product of modern technology-to intrude visu-
ally into respondent's yard. The Court argues that respond-
ent had no legitimate expectation of privacy from aerial ob-
6 The Court omits any reference to the fact that respondent's yard con-
tained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activi-
ties. At the suppression hearing, respondent sought to introduce evi-
dence showing that he did use his yard for domestic activities. The trial 
court refused to consider that evidence. Tr. on Appeal 5-8 (Aug. 15, 
1983). 
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servation. It notes that Shutz was "within public navigable 
airspace," ante, at 5, when he looked into respondent's yard, 
and then relies on the fact that the surveillance was not ac-
companied by a physical invasion of the curtilage, ibid. Reli-
ance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to the 
standard of Katz that identifies a constitutionally protected 
privacy right by focusing on the interests of the individual 
and of a free society. Since Katz, we have consistently held 
that the presence or absence of physical trespass by police is 
constitutionally irrelevant to the question whether society is 
prepared to recognize an asserted privacy interest as legiti-
mate. E. g., United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U. S., at 313. 
The Court's holding, therefore, must rest solely on the fact 
that members of the public fly in planes and may look down at 
homes as they fly over them. Ante, at 5. The Court does 
not explain why it finds this fact to be significant, but I as-
sume that the Court believes that citizens assume the risk 
that air travelers will notice activities occurring within back-
yards that are open to the sun and air. This risk, the Court 
appears to hold, nullifies expectations of privacy in those 
yards even as to purposeful police surveillance from the air. 
The Court finds support for this conclusion in United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). Ante, at 5. 
This line of reasoning is flawed. First, the actual risk to 
privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually non-
existent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as private 
planes used for business or personal reasons, normally obtain 
at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating 
glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass. 7 
7 Of course, during takeoff and landing, planes briefly fly at low enough 
altitudes to afford fleeting opportunities to observe some types of activity 
in the curtilages of residents who live within the strictly regulated takeoff 
and landing zones. As all of us know from personal experience, at least in 
passenger aircrafts, there rarely-if ever-is an opportunity for a practical 
observation and photographing of unlawful activity similar to that obtained 
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The risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe pri-
vate activities, and might connect those activities with par-
ticular people, is simply too trivial to protect against. It is 
no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many 
people build fences around their homes, but few build roofs 
over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the Court's 
suggestion, ante, at 5, people do not "'knowingly expos[e]'" 
their residential y'ards " 'to the public' " merely by failing to 
build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance. 
The Court's reliance on Knotts reveals the second problem 
with its analysis. The activities under surveillance in Knotts 
took place on public streets, not in private homes. 460 
U. S., at 281-282. Comings and goings on public streets are 
public matters, and the Constitution does not disable police 
from observing what every member of the public can see. 
The activity in this case, by contrast, took place within the 
private area immediately adjacent to a home. Yet the Court 
approves purposeful police surveillance of that activity and 
area similar to that approved in Knotts with respect to public 
activities and areas. The only possible basis for this holding 
is a judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the remote 
possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice out-
door activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial sur-
veillance. 8 But the Court utterly fails to acknowledge the 
qualitative difference between police surveillance and other 
uses made of the air space. Members of the public use the 
air space for travel or pleasure, not for the purpose of observ-
ing activities taking place within residential yards. Here, on 
by Officer Shutz in this case. The Court's analogy to commercial and pri-
vate overflights, therefore, is wholly without merit. 
8 Some of our precedents have held that an expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable in part because the individual had assumed the risk that cer-
tain kinds of private information would be turned over to the police. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). As JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL has observed, however, it is our duty to be sensitive to the risks 
that a citizen "should be forced to assume in a free and open society." 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735-750, (1979) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
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the other hand, police conducted an overflight at low altitude 
solely for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime within 
a private enclave into which they were constitutionally for-
bidden to intrude without a warrant at ground level. I can-
not believe that our society is prepared to force individuals to 
bear the risk of this type of police intrusion into their residen-
tial areas. 9 
B 
Since respondent had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
his yard, aerial surveillance undertaken by the police for the 
purpose of discovering evidence of crime constituted a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 
though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to 
this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U. S., at 717. 
This case presents no such exception. The indiscriminate 
nature of aerial surveillance, illustrated by Officer Shutz's 
photograph of respondent's home and enclosed yard as well 
as those of his neighbors, poses "far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of 
Fourth Amendment oversight." Id., at 716 (footnote omit-
ted). Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal ordering suppression of the marijuana 
plants. 
IV 
Some may believe that this case, involving no physical in-
trusion on private property, presents "the obnoxious thing in 
9 The Court's decision has serious implications for outdoor family activi-
ties conducted in the curtilage of a home. The feature of such activities 
that makes them desirable to citizens living in a free society, namely, the 
fact that they occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the Court 
as a justification for permitting police to conduct warrantless surveillance 
at will. Aerial surveillance is nearly as intrusive on family privacy as 
physical trespass into the curtilage. After today, families can expect to be 
free of official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their 
homes. 
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its mildest and least repulsive form." Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S., at 635. But this Court recognized long 
ago that the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is "not 
the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers," but rather is "the invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 
I d., at 630. Rapidly advancing technology now permits po-
lice to conduct surveillance in the home itself, an area where 
privacy interests are most cherished in our society, without 
any physical trespass. While the rule in Katz was designed 
to prevent silent and unseen invasions of Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights in a variety of settings, we have consistently 
afforded heightened protection to a person's right to be left 
alone in the privacy of his house. The Court fails to enforce 
that right or to give any weight to the long-standing pre-
sumption that warrantless intrusions into the home are un-
reasonable. 10 I dissent. 
10 Of course, the right of privacy in the home and its curtilage includes no 
right to engage in unlawful conduct there. But the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to secure a warrant before they may intrude on that privacy 
to search for evidence of suspected crime. United States v. Karo, 468 
u. s. 705, 713-715 (1984). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1513 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CIRAOLO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUS-, 
TICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
Concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), 
Justice Harlan warned that any decision to construe the 
Fourth Amendment as proscribing only physical intrusions 
by police onto private property "is, in the present day, bad 
physics as well as~_bad law, for reasonable expectations of pri-
V,!lcyt.iiiay be de!eat'td by electronic as well as physical inva-
-sion." I d., at 362. Because the Court today ignores that 
warning in an opinion that departs significantly from the 
standard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, I dissent. 
I 
As the Court's opinion reflects, the facts of this case are 
not complicated. Officer Shutz investigated an anonymous 
report that marijuana was growing in the backyard of re-
spondent's home. A tall fence prevented Shutz from looking 
into the yard from the street. The yard was directly behind 
the home so that the home itself furnished one border of the 
fence. Shutz proceeded, without obtaining a warrant, to 
charter a plane and fly over the home at an altitude of 1,000 
feet. Observing marijuana plants growing in the fenced-in 
yard, Shutz photographed respondent's home and yard, as 
well as homes and yards of neighbors. The photograph 
clearly shows that the enclosed yard also contained a small 
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swimming pool and patio. Shutz then filed an affidavit, to 
which he attached the photograph, describing the anonymous 
tip and his aerial observation of the marijuana. A warrant 
issued, 1 and a search of the yard confirmed Shutz's aerial ob-
servations. Respondent was arrested for cultivating mari-
juana, a felony under California law. 
Respondent contends that the police intruded on his con-
stitutionally protected expectation of privacy when they con-
ducted aerial surveillance of his home and photographed his 
backyard without first obtaining a warrant. The Court re-
jects that contention, holding that respondent's expectatidh 
of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reasonable as 
to intrusions on the ground, was unreasonable as to surveil:" 
lance from the navigable air space. In my view, the Court's 
holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that the air 
space generally is open to all persons for travel in airplanes. 
The Court does not explain why this single fact deprives citi-




The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." While the 
familiar history of the Amendment need not be recounted 
here, 2 we should remember that it reflects a choice that our 
society should be one in which citizens "dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Since that choice was made 
by the Framers of the Constitution, our cases construing the 
Fourth Amendment have relied in part on the common law 
1 The warrant authorized Shutz to search the home and its attached ga-
rage, as well as the yard, for marijuana, narcotics paraphernalia, records 
relating to marijuana sales, and documents identifying the occupant of the 
premises. 
2 See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-585, n. 20 (1980). 
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for instruction on "what sorts of searches the Framers . . . 
regarded as reasonable." Steagald v. United States, 451 
U. S. 204, 217 (1981). But we have repeatedly refused to 
freeze "'into constitutional law those enforcement practices 
that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's pas-
sage.'" !d., at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 591, n. 33 (1980). See United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Rather, we 
have construed the Amendment "'in light of contemporary 
norms and conditions,"' Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., 
at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, supra, at 591, 
n. 33, in order to prevent "any stealthy encroachments" on 
our citizens' right to be free of arbitrary official intrusion, 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886). Since the 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States, the Court ~as ful-
filled its duty to protect Fourth Amendment rights by asking 
if police surveillance has intruded on an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy. 
As the decision in Katz held, and dissenting opinions writ-
ten by Justices of this Court prior to Katz recognized, e. g., 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139-141 (1942) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U. S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), a standard 
that defines a Fourth Amendment "search" by reference to 
whether police have physically invaded a "constitutionally 
protected area" provides no real protection against surveil-
lance techniques made possible through technology. Tech-
nological advances have enabled police to see people's activi-
ties and associations, and to hear their conversations, 
without being in physical proximity. Moreover, the capabil-
ity now exists for police to conduct intrusive surveillance 
without any physical penetration of the walls of homes or 
other structures that citizens may believe shelters their pri-
vacy.3 Looking to the Fourth Amendment for protection 
3 As was said more than four decades ago: "[T]he search of one's home or 
office no longer requires physical entry for science has brought forth far 
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against such "broad and unsuspected governmental incur-
sions" into the "cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens," 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 
312-313 (footnote omitted), the Court in Katz abandoned its 
inquiry into whether police had committed a physical tres-
pass. Katz announced a standard under which the occur-
rence of a search turned not on the physical position of the 
police conducting the surveillance, but on whether the sur-
veillance in question had invaded a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Our decisions following the teaching of Katz illustrate that 
this inquiry "normally embraces two discrete questions." 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979). "The first is 
whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy."' Ibid., quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
The second is whether that subjective expectation "is 'one 
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."'" 
Ibid., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Har-
lan, J., 'Concurring). While the Court today purports tore-
affirm this analytical framework, its conclusory rejection of 
respondent's expectation of privacy in the yard of his resi-
dence as one that "is unreasonable," ante, at 5, represents a 
turning away from the principles that have guided our 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Court's rejection of re-
spondent's Fourth Amendment claim is curiously at odds 
more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct 
and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears 
and which inspired the Fourth Amendment. . . . Whether the search of 
private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls of the sanc-
tum a detectaphone that transmits to the outside listener the intimate de-
tails of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that pen-
etrate walls or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally 
invaded by the Government and intimate personal matters are laid bare to 
view." Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). Since 1942, science has developed far more sophisticated 
means of surveillance. 
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with its purported reaffirmation of the curtilage doctrine, 
both in this decision and its companion case, Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1986), and particularly 
with its conclusion in Dow that expectations of privacy in the 
curtilage are legitimate, id., at--. 
The second question under Katz has been described as ask-
ing whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate in the 
sense required by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U. S. 170, 182 (1984). The answer turns 
on "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id., at 182-183. While no single consideration has 
been regarded as dispositive, "the Court has given weight to 
such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, ... the uses to which the individual has put a 
location, . . . and our societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from govern-
ment invasion." 4 Id., at 178 (citations omitted) . . Our deci-
sions have made clear that this inquiry often must be decided 
by "reference to a 'place,'" Katz v. United States, supra, at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S., at 589, and that a home is a place in which a subjective 
expectation of privacy virtually always will be legitimate, 
ibid.; see, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 
713-715 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., at 
211-212. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a [person] to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 
(1961). 
• "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and per-
mitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 
(1978). This inquiry necessarily focuses on personal interests in privacy 
and liberty recognized by a free society. 
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B 
This case involves surveillance of a home, for as we stated 
in Oliver v. United States, the curtilage "has been considered 
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." 
466 U. S., at 180. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 
decided today, the Court reaffirms that the "curtilage doc-
trine evolved to protect much the same kind of privacy as 
that covering the interior of a structure." -- U. S., at 
--. The Court in Dow emphasizes, moreover, that society 
is prepared to accept as legitimate citizens' expectations of 
privacy in the area immediately surrounding their homes. 
Ibid. 
In deciding whether an area is within the curtilage, courts 
"have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refer-
ence to the factors that determine whether an individual rea-
sonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the 
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. Van 
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United 
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 
(1956)." Ibid. The lower federal courts have agreed that 
the curtilage is "an area of domestic use immediately sur-
rounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with 
the dwelling." 5 United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 
686, 692 (Md. 1967); see United States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 
993, n. 1. Those courts also have held that whether an area 
is within the curtilage must be decided by looking at all of the 
facts. Ibid., quoting Care v. United States, supra, at 25. 
Relevant facts include the proximity between the area 
claimed to be curtilage and the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident 
6 The Oxford English Dictionary defines curtilage as "a small court, 
yard, garth, or piece of ground attached to a dwelling-house, and fanning 
one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and 
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings." 2 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 1278 (1933). 
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to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 
See Care v. United States, supra, at 25; see also United 
States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 993-994. 
III 
A 
The Court begins its analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
issue posed here by deciding that respondent had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his backyard. I agree with that conclusion 
because of the close proximity of the yard to the house, the 
nature of some of the activities respondent conducted there, 6 
and because he had taken steps to shield those activities from 
the view of passersby. The Court then implicitly acknowl-
edges that society is prepared to recognize his expectation as 
legitimate with respect to ground-level surveillance, holding 
that the yard was within the curtilage, an area in which 
privacy interests have been afforded the "most heightened" 
protection. Ante, at 5. As the foregoing discussion of the 
curtilage doctrine demonstrates, respondent's yard unques-
tionably was within the curtilage. Since Officer Shutz could 
not see into this private family area from the street, the 
Court certainly would agree that he would have conducted an 
unreasonable search had he climbed over the fence, or used a 
ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a warrant. 
See United States v. Van Dyke, supra; United States v. Wil-
liams, supra. 
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that Shutz could use an 
airplane-a product of modern technology-to intrude visu-
ally into respondent's yard. The Court argues that respond-
ent had no legitimate expectation of privacy from aerial ob-
1 The Court omits any reference to the fact that respondent's yard con-
tained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activi-
ties. At the suppression hearing, respondent sought to introduce evi-
dence showing that he did use his yard for domestic activities. The trial 
court refused to consider that evidence. Tr. on Appeal 5-8 (Aug. 15, 
1983). 
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servation. It notes that Shutz was "within public navigable 
airspace," ante, at 5, when he looked into and photographed 
respondent's yard. It then relies on the fact that the surveil-
lance was not accompanied by a physical invasion of the curti-
lage, ibid. Reliance on the manner of surveillance is di-
rectly contrary to the standard of Katz that identifies a 
constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on the in-
terests of the individual and of a free society. Since Katz, 
we have consistently held that the presence or absence of 
physical trespass by police is constitutionally irrelevant to 
the question whether society is prepared to recognize an as'-
serted privacy interest as legitimate. E. g., United States_ 
v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 313. 
The Court's holding, therefore, must rest solely on the fact 
that members of the public fly in planes and may look down at 
homes as they fly over them. Ante, at 5. The Court does 
not explain why it find~ this fact to be significant. One may 
assume that the Court believes that citizens bear the risk 
that air travelers will observe activities occurring within 
backyards that are open to the sun and air. This risk, the 
Court appears to hold, nullifies expectations of privacy in 
those yards even as to purposeful police surveillance from the 
air. The Court finds support for this conclusion in United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). Ante, at 5. 
This line of reasoning is flawed. First, the actual risk to 
privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually 
nonexistent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as pri-
vate planes used for business or personal reasons, normally 
obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating 
glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass. 7 
1 Of course, during takeoff and landing, planes briefly fly at low enough 
altitudes to afford fleeting opportunities to observe some types of activity 
in the curtilages of residents who live within the strictly regulated takeoff 
and landing zones. As all of us know from personal experience, at least in 
passenger aircrafts, there rarely-if ever-is an opportunity for a practical 
observation and photographing of unlawful activity similar to that obtained 
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The risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe pri-
vate activities, and might connect those activities with par-
ticular people, is simply too trivial to protect against. It is 
no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many 
people build fences around their residential areas, but few 
build roofs over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the 
Court's suggestion, ante, at 5, people do not "'knowingly ex-
pos[e]"' their residential yards '"to the public"' merely by 
failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance. 
The Court's reliance on Knotts reveals the second problem 
with its analysis. The activities under surveillance in Knotts 
took place on public streets, not in private homes. 460 
U. S., at 281-282. Comings and goings on public streets are 
public matters, and the Constitution does not disable police 
from observing what every member of the public can see. 
The activity in this case, by contrast, took place within the 
private area immediately adjacent to a home. Yet the Court 
approves purposeful police surveillance of that activity and 
area similar to that approved in Knotts with respect to public 
activities and areas. The only possible basis for this holding 
is a judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the remote 
possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice out-
door activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial sur-
veillance. 8 But the Court fails to acknowledge the qualita-
tive difference between police surveillance and other uses 
made of the air space. Members of the public use the air 
space for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of 
by Officer Shutz in this case. The Court's analogy to commercial and 
private overflights, therefore, is wholly without merit. 
8 Some of our precedents have held that an expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable in part because the individual had assumed the risk that 
certain kinds of private information would be turned over to the police. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). None of the prior 
decisions of this Court is a precedent for today's decision. As JUSTICE 
MARsHALL has observed, it is our duty to be sensitive to the risks that a 
citizen "should be forced to assume in a free and open society." Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735-750, (1979) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
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observing activities taking place within residential yards. 
Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for 
the purpose of discovering evidence of crime within a private 
enclave into which they were constitutionally forbidden to in-
trude at ground level without a warrant. It is not easy to 
believe that our society is prepared to force individuals to 
bear the risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into 
their residential areas. 9 
B 
Since respondent had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
his yard, aerial surveillance undertaken by the police for the 
purpose of discovering evidence of crime constituted a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
''Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 
though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to 
this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U. S., at 717. 
This case presents no such exception. The indiscriminate 
nature of aerial surveillance, illustrated by Officer Shutz's 
photograph of respondent's home and enclosed yard as well 
as those of his neighbors, poses "far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of 
Fourth Amendment oversight." I d. , at 716 (footnote omit-
ted). Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal ordering suppression of the marijuana 
plants. 
IV 
Some may believe that this case, involving no physical in-
trusion on private property, presents "the obnoxious thing in 
1 The Court's decision has serious implications for outdoor family activi-
ties conducted in the curtilage of a home. The feature of such activities 
that makes them desirable to citizens living in a free society, namely, the 
fact that they occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the Court 
as a justification for permitting police to conduct warrantless surveillance 
at will. Aerial surveillance is nearly as intrusive on family privacy as 
physical trespass into the curtilage. It would appear that, after today, 
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its mildest and least repulsive form." Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S., at 635. But this Court recognized long 
ago that the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is "not 
the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers," but rather is "the invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 
I d., at 630. Rapidly advancing technology now permits po-
lice to conduct surveillance in the home itself, an area where 
privacy interests are most cherished in our society, without 
any physical trespass. While the rule in Katz was designed 
to prevent silent and unseen invasions of Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights in a variety of settings, we have consistently 
afforded heightened protection to a person's right to be left 
alone in the privacy of his house. The Court fails to enforce 
that right or to give any weight to the long-standing pre-
sumption that warrantless intrusions into the home are un-
reasonable. 10 I dissent. 
families can expect to be free of official surveillance only when they retreat 
behind the walls of their homes. 
10 Of course, the right of privacy in the home and its curtilage includes no 
right to engage in unlawful conduct there. But the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to secure a warrant before they may intrude on that privacy 
to search for evidence of suspected crime. United States v. Karo, 468 
u. s. 705, 713-715 (1984). 
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CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, Jus-
TICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
Concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), 
Justice Harlan warned that any decision to construe the 
Fourth Amendment as proscribing only physical intrusions 
by police onto private property "is, in the present day, bad 
physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical inva-
sion." I d., at 362. Because the Court today ignores that 
warning in an opinion that departs significantly from the 
standard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, I dissent. 
I 
As the Court's opinion reflects, the facts of this case are 
not complicated. Officer Shutz investigated an anonymous 
report that marijuana was growing in the backyard of re-
spondent's home. A tall fence prevented Shutz from looking 
into the yard from the street. The yard was directly behind 
the home so that the home itself furnished one border of the 
fence. Shutz proceeded, without obtaining a warrant, to 
charter a plane and fly over the home at an altitude of 1,000 
feet. Observing marijuana plants growing in the fenced-in 
yard, Shutz photographed respondent's home and yard, as 
well as homes and yards of neighbors. The photograph 
clearly shows that the enclosed yard also contained a small 
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swimming pool and patio. Shutz then filed an affidavit, to 
which he attached the photograph, describing the anonymous 
tip and his aerial observation of the marijuana. A warrant 
issued, 1 and a search of the yard confirmed Shutz's aerial ob-
servations. Respondent was arrested for cultivating mari-
juana, a felony under California law. 
Respondent contends that the police intruded on his con-
stitutionally protected expectation of privacy when they con-
ducted aerial surveillance of his home and photographed his 
backyard without first obtaining a warrant. The Court re-
jects that contention, holding that respondent's expectation 
of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reasonable as 
to intrusions on the ground, was unreasonable as to surveil-
lance from the navigable air space. In my view, the Court's 
holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that the air 
space generally is open to all persons for travel in airplanes. 
The Court does not explain why this single fact deprives citi-




The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." While the 
familiar history of the Amendment need not be recounted 
here,Z we should remember that it reflects a choice that our 
society should be one in which citizens "dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Since that choice was made. 
by the Framers of the Constitution, our cases construing the 
Fourth Amendment have relied in part on the common law 
' The warrant authorized Shutz to search the home and its attached 
garage, as well as the yard, for marijuana, narcotics paraphernalia, records 
relating to marijuana sales, and documents identifying the occupant of the 
premises. 
' See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583-585, n. 20 (1980). 
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for instruction on "what sorts of searches the Framers . . . 
regarded as reasonable." Steagald v. United States, 451 
U. S. 204, 217 (1981). But we have repeatedly refused to 
freeze "'into constitutional law those enforcement practices 
that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's pas-
sage."' ld., at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 591, n. 33 (1980). See United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Rather, we 
have construed the Amendment "'in light of contemporary 
norms and conditions,'" Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., 
at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, supra, at 591, 
n. 33, in order to prevent "any stealthy encroachments" on 
our citizens' right to be free of arbitrary official intrusion, 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886). Since the 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States, the Court has ful-
filled its duty to protect Fourth Amendment rights by asking 
if police surveillance has intruded on an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy. 
As the decision in Katz held, and dissenting opinions writ-
ten by Justices of this Court prior to Katz recognized, e. g., 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139-141 (1942) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U. S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), a standard 
that defines a Fourth Amendment "search" by reference to 
whether police have physically invaded a "constitutionally 
protected area" provides no real protection against surveil-
lance techniques made possible through technology. Tech-
nological advances have enabled police to see people's activi-
ties and associations, and to hear their conversations, 
without being in physical proximity. Moreover, the capabil-
ity now exists for police to conduct intrusive surveillance 
without any physical penetration of the walls of homes or 
other structures that citizens may believe shelters their pri-
vacy.3 Looking to the Fourth Amendment for protection 
3 As was said more than four decades ago: "[T]he search of one's home or 
office no longer requires physical entry for science has brought forth far 
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against such "broad and unsuspected governmental incur-
sions" into the "cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens," 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 
312-313 (footnote omitted), the Court in Katz abandoned its 
inquiry into whether police had committed a physical tres-
pass. Katz announced a standard under which the occur-
rence of a search turned not on the physical position of the 
police conducting the surveillance, but on whether the sur-
veillance in question had invaded a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Our decisions following the teaching of Katz illustrate that 
this inquiry "normally embraces two discrete questions." 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979). "The first is 
whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy."' Ibid., quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
The second is whether that subjective expectation "is 'one 
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."'" 
Ibid., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). While the Court today purports to re-
affirm this analytical framework, its conclusory rejection of 
respondent's expectation of privacy in the yard of his resi-
dence as one that "is unreasonable," ante, at 5, represents a 
turning away from the principles that have guided our 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Court's rejection of re-
spondent's Fourth Amendment claim is curiously at odds 
more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct 
and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears 
and which inspired the Fourth Amendmtmt .... Whether the search of 
private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls of the 
sanctum a detectaphone that transmits to the outside listener the intimate 
details of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that 
penetrate walls or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally 
invaded by the Government and intimate personal matters are laid bare to 
view." Goldman v. United States , 316 U. S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). Since 1942, science has developed even more sophisticated 
means of surveillance. 
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with its purported reaffirmation of the curtilage doctrine, 
both in this decision and its companion case, Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States, post, p. --, and particularly with its 
conclusion in Dow that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the curtilage, id., at 
The second question under Katz has been described as ask-
ing whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate in the 
sense required by the Fourth Amendment." 4 Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U. S. 170, 182 (1984). The answer turns 
on "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id., at 182-183. While no single consideration has 
been regarded as dispositive, "the Court has given weight to 
such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, ... the uses to which the individual has put a 
location, . . . and our societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from govern-
ment invasion." 5 Id., at 178 (citations omitted). Our deci-
sions have made clear that this inquiry often must be decided 
by "reference to a 'place,"' Katz v. United States, supra, at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S., at 589, and that a home is a place in which a subjective 
'In Justice Harlan's classic description, an actual expectation of privacy 
is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection if it is an expectation that soci-
ety recognizes as "reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 
(Harlan, J. , concurring). Since Katz, our decisions also have described 
constitutionally protected privacy interests as those that society regards as 
"legitimate," using the words "reasonable" and "legitimate" interchange-
ably. E. g., Oliver v. United States, supra; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 
128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). 
5 "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 
(1978). This inquiry necessarily focuses on personal interests in privacy 
and liberty recognized by a free society. 
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expectation of privacy virtually always will be legitimate, 
ibid.; see, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 
713-715 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., at 
211-212. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a [person] to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 
(1961). 
B 
This case involves surveillance of a home, for as we stated 
in Oliver v. United States, the curtilage "has been considered 
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." 
466 U. S., at 180. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 
decided today, the Court reaffirms that the "curtilage doc-
trine evolved to protect much the same kind of privacy as 
that covering the interior of a structure." Post, at --. 
The Court in Dow emphasizes, moreover, that society ac-
cepts as reasonable citizens' expectations of privacy in the 
area immediately surrounding their homes. Ibid. 
In deciding whether an area is within the curtilage, courts 
"have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refer-
ence to the factors that determine whether an individual rea-
sonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the 
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. Van 
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United 
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 
(1956)." Ibid. The lower federal courts have agreed that 
the curtilage is "an area of domestic use immediately sur-
rounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with 
the dwelling." 6 United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 
• The Oxford English Dictionary defines curtilage as "a small court, 
yard, garth, or piece of ground attached to a dwelling-house, and forming 
one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and 
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings." 2 Oxford English 
Dictionary 1278 (1933). 
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686, 692 (Md. 1967); see United States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 
993, n. 1. Those courts also have held that whether an area 
is within the curtilage must be decided by looking at all of the 
facts. Ibid., quoting Care v. United States, supra, at 25. 
Relevant facts include the proximity between the area 
claimed to be curtilage and the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident 
to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 
See Care v. United States, supra, at 25; see also United 
States v. Van Dyke, supra, at 993-994. 
III 
A 
The Court begins its analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
issue posed here by deciding that respondent had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his backyard. I agree with that conclusion 
because of the close proximity of the yard to the house, the 
nature of some of the activities respondent conducted there, 7 
and because he had taken steps to shield those activities from 
the view of passersby. The Court then implicitly acknowl-
edges that society is prepared to recognize his expectation as 
reasonable with respect to ground-level surveillance, holding 
that the yard was within the curtilage, an area in which 
privacy interests have been afforded the "most heightened" 
protection. Ante, at 5. As the foregoing discussion of the 
curtilage doctrine demonstrates, respondent's yard unques-
tionably was within the curtilage. Since Officer Shutz could 
not see into this private family area from the street, the 
Court certainly would agree that he would have conducted an 
unreasonable search had he climbed over the fence, or used a 
7 The Court omits any reference to the fact that respondent's yard 
contained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private 
activities. At the suppression hearing, respondent sought to introduce 
evidence showing that he did use his yard for domestic activities. The 
trial court refused to consider that evidence. Tr. on Appeal 5-8 (Aug. 15, 
1983). 
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ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a warrant. 
See United States v. Van Dyke, supra; United States v. Wil-
liams, supra. . 
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that Shutz could use an 
airplane-a product of modern technology-to intrude visu-
ally into respondent's yard. The Court argues that respond-
ent had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial ob-
servation. It notes that Shutz was "within public navigable 
airspace," ante, at 5, when he looked into and photographed 
respondent's yard. It then relies on the fact that the surveil-
lance was not accompanied by a physical invasion of the curti-
lage, ibid. Reliance on the manner of surveillance is di-
rectly contrary to the standard of Katz that identifies a 
constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on the in-
terests of the individual and of a free society. Since Katz, 
we have consistently held that the presence or absence of 
physical trespass by police is constitutionally irrelevant to 
the question whether society is prepared to recognize an as-
serted privacy interest as reasonable. E. g., United States 
v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 313. 
The Court's holding, therefore, must rest solely on the fact 
that members of the public fly in planes and may look down at 
homes as they fly over them. Ante, at 5. The Court does 
not explain why it finds this fact to be significant. One may 
assume that the Court believes that citizens bear the risk 
that air travelers will observe activities occurring within 
backyards that are open to the sun and air. This risk, the 
Court appears to hold, nullifies expectations of privacy in 
those yards even as to purposeful police surveillance from the 
air. The Court finds support for this conclusion in United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). Ante, at 5. 
This line of reasoning is flawed. First, the actual risk to 
privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually 
nonexistent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as pri-
vate planes used for business or personal reasons, normally 
obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating 
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glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass. 8 
The risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe pri-
vate activities, and might connect those activities with par-
ticular people, is simply too trivial to protect against. It is 
no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many 
people build fences around their residential areas, but few 
build roofs over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the 
Court's suggestion, ante, at 5, people do not "'knowingly ex-
pos[e]'" their residential yards "'to the public'" merely by 
failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance. 
The Court's reliance on Knotts reveals the second problem 
with its analysis. The activities under surveillance in Knotts 
took place on public streets, not in private homes. 460 
U. S., at 281-282. Comings and goings on public streets are 
public matters, and the Constitution does not disable police 
from observing what every member of the public can see. 
The activity in this case, by contrast, took place within the 
private area immediately adjacent to a home. Yet the Court 
approves purposeful police surveillance of that activity and 
area similar to that approved in Knotts with respect to public 
activities and areas. The only possible basis for this holding 
is a judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the remote 
possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice out-
door activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial sur-
veillance. 9 But the Court fails to acknowledge the qualita-
8 Of course, during takeoff and landing, planes briefly fly at low enough 
altitudes to afford fleeting opportunities to observe some types of activity 
in the curtilages of residents who live within the strictly regulated takeoff 
and landing zones. As all of us know from personal experience, at least in 
passenger aircrafts, there rarely-if ever-is an opportunity for a practical 
observation and photographing of unlawful activity similar to that obtained 
by Officer Shutz in this case. The Court's analogy to commercial and 
private overflights, therefore, is wholly without merit. 
' Some of our precedents have held that an expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable in part because the individual had assumed the risk that 
certain kinds of private information would be turned over to the police. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). None of the prior 
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tive difference between police surveillance and other uses 
made of the air space. Members of the public use the air 
space for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of 
observing activities taking place within residential yards. 
Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for 
the purpose of discovering evidence of crime within a private 
enclave into which they were constitutionally forbidden to in-
trude at ground level without a warrant. It is not easy to 
believe that our society is prepared to force individuals to 
bear the risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into 
their residential areas. 10 
B 
Since respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his yard, aerial surveillance undertaken by the police for 
the purpose of discovering evidence of crime constituted a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 
though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to 
this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U. S., at 717. 
This case presents no such exception. The indiscriminate 
nature of aerial surveillance, illustrated by Officer Shutz's 
photograph of respondent's home and enclosed yard as well 
as those of his neighbors, poses "far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of 
decisions of this Court is a precedent for today's decision. As JUSTICE 
MARSHALL has observed, it is our duty to be sensitive to the risks that a 
citizen "should be forced to assume in a free and open society." Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735-750, (1979) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
10 The Court's decision has serious implications for outdoor family activi-
ties conducted in the curtilage of a home. The feature of such activities 
that makes them desirable to citizens living in a free society, namely, the 
fact that they occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the Court 
as a justification for permitting police to conduct warrantless surveillance 
at will. Aerial surveillance is nearly as intrusive on family privacy as 
physical trespass into the curtilage. It would appear that, after today, 
families can expect to be free of official surveillance only when they retreat 
behind the walls of their homes. 
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Fourth Amendment oversight." !d., at 716 (footnote omit-
ted). Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal ordering suppression of the marijuana 
plants. 
IV 
Some may believe that this case, involving no physical in-
trusion on private property, presents "the obnoxious thing in 
its mildest and least repulsive form." Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S., at 635. But this Court recognized long 
ago that the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is "not 
the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers," but rather is "the invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 
I d., at 630. Rapidly advancing technology now permits po-
lice to conduct surveillance in the home itself, an area where 
privacy interests are most cherished in our society, without 
any physical trespass. While the rule in Katz was designed 
to prevent silent and unseen invasions of Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights in a variety of settings, we have consistently 
afforded heightened protection to a person's right to be left 
alone in the privacy of his house. The Court fails to enforce 
that right or to give any weight to the long-standing pre-
sumption that warrantless intrusions into the home are un-
reasonable. 11 I dissent. 
11 Of course, the right of privacy in the home and its curtilage includes no 
right to engage in unlawful conduct there. But the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to secure a warrant before they may intrude on that privacy 
to search for evidence of suspected crime. United States v. Karo, 468 
u. s. 705, 713-715 (1984). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUS-
TICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
Concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), 
Justice Harlan warned that any decision to construe the 
Fourth Amendment as proscribing only physical intrusions 
by ·police onto private property "is, in the pre~ent day, bad 
physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of 
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical 
invasion." I d., at 362. Because the Court today igriores 
that warning in an opinion that departs significantly from the 
standard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, I dissent. 
I 
As the Court's opinion reflects, the facts of this case are 
not complicated. Officer Shutz investigated an anonymous 
report that marijuana was growing in the backyard of re-
spondent's home. A tall fence prevented Shutz from looking 
into the yard from the street. The yard was directly behind 
the home so that the home itself furnished one border of the 
fence. Shutz proceeded, without obtaining a warrant, to 
charter a plane and fly over the home at an altitude of 1, 000 
feet. Observing marijuana plants growing in the fenced-in 
yard, Shutz photographed respondent's home and yard, as 
well as homes and yards of neighbors. The photograph 
clearly shows that the enclosed yard also contained a small 
' .. 
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swimming pool and patio. Shutz then filed an affidavit, to 
which he attached the photograph, describing the anonymous 
tip and his aerial observation of the marijuana. A warrant 
issued, 1 and a search of the yard confirmed Shutz's aerial 
observations. Respondent was arrested for cultivating 
marijuana, a felony under California law. 
Respondent contends that the police intruded on his 
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy when they 
conducted aerial surveillance of his home and photographed 
his backyard without first obtaining a warrant. The Court 
rejects that contention, holding that respondent's expecta-
tion of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reason-
able as to intrusions on the ground, was unreasonable as to 
surveillance from the navigable air space. In my view, the 
Court's holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that 
the air space generally is open to all persons for travel in air-
planes. The Court does not explain why this single fact de-
prives citizens of their privacy interest in outdoor activities 
in an enclosed curtilage. 
II 
A 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." While the 
familiar history of the Amendment need not be recounted 
here, 2 we should remember that it reflects a choice that our 
society should be one in which citizens "dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Since that choice was made 
by the Framers of the Constitution, our cases construing the 
Fourth Amendment have relied in part on the common law 
'The warrant authorized Shutz to search the home and its attached 
garage, as well as the yard, for marijuana, narcotics paraphernalia, records 
relating to marijuana sales, and documents identifying the occupant of the 
premises. 
2 See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-585, n. 20 (1980). 
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for instruction on "what sorts of searches the Framers . . . 
regarded as reasonable." Steagald v. United States, 451 
U. S. 204, 217 (1981). But we have repeatedly refused to 
freeze "'into constitutional law those enforcement practices 
that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's pas-
sage."' Id., at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 591, n. 33 (1980). See United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). Rather, we 
have construed the Amendment "'in light of contemporary 
norms and conditions,"' Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., 
at 217, n. 10, quoting Payton v. New York, supra, at 591, 
n. 33, in order to prevent "any stealthy encroachments" on 
our citizens' right to be free of arbitrary official intrusion, 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886). Since the 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States, the Court has 
fulfilled its duty to protect Fourth Amendment rights by ask-
ing if police surveillance has intruded on an individual's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 
As the decision in Katz held, and dissenting opinions 
written by Justices of this Court prior to Katz recognized, 
e. g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139-141 
(1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. [Jnited States, 
277 U. S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), a stand-
ard that defines a Fourth Amendment "search" by reference 
to whether police have physically invaded a "constitutionally 
protected area" provides no real protection against surveil-
lance techniques made possible through technology. Tech-
nological advances have enabled police to see people's activi-
ties and associations, and to hear their conversations, 
without being in physical proximity. Moreover, the capabil-
ity now exists for police to conduct intrusive surveillance 
without any physical penetration of the walls of homes or 
other structures that citizens may believe shelters their pri-
vacy.3 Looking to the Fourth Amendment for protection 
3 As was said more than four decades ago: "[T]he search of one's home or 
office no longer requires physical entry for science has brought forth far 
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against such "broad and unsuspected governmental incur-
sions" into the "cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens," 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 
312-313 (footnote omitted), the Court in Katz abandoned its 
inquiry into whether police had committed a physical tres-
pass. Katz announced a standard under which the occur-
rence of a search turned not on the physical position of the 
police conducting the surveillance, but on whether the sur-
veillance in question had invaded a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Our decisions following the teaching of Katz illustrate that 
this inquiry "normally embraces two discrete questions." 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979). "The first is 
whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expecta~ion of privacy."' Ibid., quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). The second is whether that subjective expectation "is 
'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."'" 
Ibid., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). While the Court today purports to 
reaffirm this analytical framework, its conclusory rejection of 
respondent's expectation of privacy in the yard of his resi-
dence as one that "is unreasonable," ante, at 5, represents a 
turning away from the principles that have guided our 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Court's rejection of 
respondent's Fourth Amendment claim is curiously at odds 
more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct 
and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears 
and which inspired the Fourth Amendment .... Whether the search of 
private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls of the 
sanctum a detectaphone that transmits to the outside listener the intimate 
details of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that 
penetrate walls or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally 
invaded by the Government and intimate personal matters are laid bare to 
view." Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). Since 1942, science has developed even more sophisticated 
means of surveillance. 
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with its purported reaffirmation of the curtilage doctrine, 
both in this decision and its companion case, Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States, post, p. --, and particularly with its 
conclusion in Dow that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the curtilage, id., at 
--. 
The second question under Katz has been described as 
asking whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate in the 
sense required by the Fourth Amendment." 4 Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U. S. 170, 182 (1984). The answer turns 
on "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." ld., at 182-183. While no single consideration has 
been regarded as dispositive, "the Court has given weight to 
such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, ... the uses to which the individual has put a 
location, . . . and our societal understanding that certain 
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from govern-
ment invasion." 5 ld., at 178 (citations omitted). Our deci-
sions have made clear that this inquiry often must be decided 
by "reference to a 'place,"' Katz v. United States, supra, at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S., at 589, and that a home is a place in which a subjective 
'In Justice Harlan's classic description, an actual expectation of privacy 
is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection if it is an expectation that 
society recognizes as "reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Since Katz, our decisions also have de-
scribed constitutionally protected privacy interests as those that society 
regards as "legitimate," using the words "reasonable" and "legitimate" in-
terchangeably. E. g., Oliver v. United States, supra; Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). 
• "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and 
pennitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 
(1978). This inquiry necessarily focuses on personal interests in privacy 
and liberty recognized by a free society. 
f 
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expectation of privacy virtually always will be legitimate, 
ibid.; see, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 
713-715 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S., at 
211-212. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a [person] to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 
(1961). 
B 
This case involves surveillance of a home, for as we stated 
in Oliver v. United States, the curtilage "has been considered 
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." 
466 U. S., at 180. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 
decided today, the Court reaffirms that the "curtilage 
doctrine evolved to protect much the same kind of privacy as 
that covering the interior of a structure." Post, at --. 
The Court in Dow emphasizes, moreover, that society 
accepts as reasonable citizens' expectations of privacy in the 
area immediately surrounding their homes. Ibid. 
In deciding whether an area is within the curtilage, courts 
"have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refer-
ence to the factors that determine whether an individual rea-
sonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the 
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. Van 
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United 
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 
(1956)." Oliver v. United States, supra, at 180. The lower 
federal courts have agreed that the curtilage is "an area of 
domestic use immediately surrounding a dwelling and usually 
but not always fenced in with the dwelling." 6 United States 
• The Oxford English Dictionary defines curtilage as "a small court, 
yard, garth, or piece of ground attached to a dwelling-house, and forming 
one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and 
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings." 2 Oxford English 
Dictionary 1278 (1933). 
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v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (Md. 1967); see United 
States v. Van Dyke , supra, at 993, n. 1. Those courts also 
have held that whether an area is within the curtilage must 
be decided by looking at all of the facts. Ibid., quoting Care 
v. United States, supra, at 25. Relevant facts include the 
proximity between the area claimed to be curtilage and the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the 
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observa-
tion by people passing by. See Care v. United States , 




The Court begins its analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
issue posed here by deciding that respondent had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his backyard. I agree with that conclusion 
because of the close proximity of the yard to the house, the 
nature of some of the activities respondent conducted there, 7 
and because he had taken steps to shield those activities from 
the view of passersby. The Court then implicitly acknowl-
edges that society is prepared to recognize his expectation as 
reasonable with respect to ground-level surveillance, holding 
that the yard was within the curtilage, an area in which 
privacy interests have been afforded the "most heightened" 
protection. Ante, at 5. As the foregoing discussion of the 
curtilage doctrine demonstrates, respondent's yard unques-
tionably was within the curtilage. Since Officer Shutz could 
not see into this private family area from the street, the 
Court certainly would agree that he would have conducted an 
unreasonable search had he climbed over the fence, or used a 
7 The Court omits any reference to the fact that respondent's yard 
contained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private 
activities. At the suppression hearing, respondent sought to introduce 
evidence showing that he did use his yard for domestic activities. The 
trial court refused to consider that evidence. Tr. on Appeal 5-8 (Aug. 15, 
1983). 
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ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a warrant. 
See United States v. Van Dyke, supra; see also United States 
v. Williams, supra. 
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that Shutz could use an 
airplane-a product of modern technology-to intrude visu-
ally into respondent's yard. The Court argues that respond-
ent had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial ob-
servation. It notes that Shutz was "within public navigable 
airspace," ante, at 5, when he looked into and photographed 
respondent's yard. It then relies on the fact that the surveil-
lance was not accompanied by a physical invasion of the curti-
lage, ibid. Reliance on the manner of surveillance is di-
rectly contrary to the standard of Katz, which identifies 
a constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on the 
interests of the individual and of a free society. Since Katz, 
we have consistently held that the presence or absence of 
physical trespass by police is constitutionally irrelevant to 
the question whether society is prepared to recognize an as-
serted privacy interest as reasonable. E. g., United States 
v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 313. 
The Court's holding, therefore, must rest solely on the fact 
that members of the public fly in planes and may look down at 
homes as they fly over them. Ante, at 5. The Court does 
not explain why it finds this fact to be significant. One may 
assume that the Court believes that citizens bear the risk 
that air travelers will observe activities occurring within 
backyards that are open to the sun and air. This risk, the 
Court appears to hold, nullifies expectations of privacy in 
those yards even as to purposeful police surveillance from the 
air. The Court finds support for this conclusion in United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). Ante, at 5. 
This line of reasoning is flawed. First, the actual risk to 
privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually 
nonexistent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as 
private planes used for business or personal reasons, nor-
mally obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and 
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nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings 
over which they pass. 8 The risk that a passenger on such a 
plane might observe private activities, and might connect 
those activities with particular people, is simply too trivial to 
protect against. It is no accident that, as a matter of com-
mon experience, many people build fences around their resi-
dential areas, but few build roofs over their backyards. 
Therefore, contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 5, 
people do not "'knowingly expos[ e)'" their residential yards 
"'to the public'" merely by failing to build barriers that pre-
vent aerial surveillance. 
The Court's reliance on Knotts reveals the second problem 
with its analysis. The activities under surveillance in Knotts 
took place on public streets, not in private homes. 460 
U. S., at 281-282. Comings and goings on public streets are 
public matters, and the Constitution does not disable police 
from observing what every member of the public can see. 
The activity in this case, by contrast, took place within the 
private area immediately adjacent to a home. Yet the Court 
approves purposeful police surveillance of that activity and 
area similar to that approved in Knotts with respect to public 
activities and areas. The only possible basis for this holding 
is a judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the remote 
possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice out-
door activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial sur-
veillance. 9 But the Court fails to acknowledge the qualita-
8 Of course, during takeoff and landing, planes briefly fly at low enough 
altitudes to afford fleeting opportunities to observe some types of activity 
in the curtilages of residents who live within the strictly regulated takeoff 
and landing zones. As all of us know from personal experience, at least in 
passenger aircrafts, there rarely-if ever-is an opportunity for a practical 
observation and photographing of unlawful activity similar to that obtained 
by Officer Shutz in this case. The Court's analogy to commercial and 
private overflights, therefore, is wholly without merit. 
9 Some of our precedents have held that an expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable in part because the individual had assumed the risk that 
certain kinds of private information would be turned over to the police. 
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tive difference between police surveillance and other uses 
made of the air space. Members of the public use the air 
space for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of 
observing activities taking place within residential yards. 
Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for 
the purpose of discovering evidence of crime within a private 
enclave into which they were constitutionally forbidden to 
intrude at ground level without a warrant. It is not easy to 
believe that our society is prepared to force individuals to 
bear the risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into 
their residential areas. 10 
B 
Since respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his yard, aerial surveillance undertaken by the police 
for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime constituted 
a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 
though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to 
this general rule." United States v. Karo , 468 U. S., at 717. 
This case presents no such exception. The indiscriminate 
nature of aerial surveillance, illustrated by Officer Shutz's 
photograph of respondent's home and enclosed yard as well 
as those of his neighbors, poses "far too serious a threat to 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). None of the prior 
decisions of this Court is a precedent for today's decision. As JuSTICE 
MARSHALL has observed, it is our duty to be sensitive to the risks that a 
citizen "should be forced to assume in a free and open society." Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 750, (1979) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
'
0 The Court's decision has serious implications for outdoor family activi-
ties conducted in the curtilage of a home. The feature of such activities 
that makes them desirable to citizens living in a free society, namely, the 
fact that they occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the Court 
as a justification for permitting police to conduct warrantless surveillance 
at will. Aerial surveillance is nearly as intrusive on family privacy as 
physical trespass into the curtilage. It would appear that, after today, 
families can expect to be free of official surveillance only when they retreat 
behind the walls of their homes. 
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privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of 
Fourth Amendment oversight." ld., at 716 (footnote omit-
ted). Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal ordering suppression of the marijuana 
plants. 
IV 
Some may believe that this case, involving no physical 
intrusion on private property, presents "the obnoxious thing 
in its mildest and least repulsive form." Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S., at 635. But this Court recognized long 
ago that the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is "not 
the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers," but rather is "the invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 
I d., at 630. Rapidly advancing technology now permits 
police to conduct surveillance in the home itself, an area 
where privacy interests are most cherished in our society, 
without any physical trespass. While the rule in Katz was 
designed to prevent silent and unseen invasions of Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights in a variety of .settings, we have 
consistently afforded heightened protection to a person's 
right to be left alone in the privacy of his house. The Court 
fails to enforce that right or to give any weight to the long-
standing presumption that warrantless intrusions into the 
home are unreasonable. 11 I dissent. · 
" Of course, the right of privacy in the home and its curtilage includes no 
right to engage in unlawful conduct there. But the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to secure a warrant before they may intrude on that privacy 
to search for evidence of suspected crime. United States v. Karo, 468 
u. s. 705, 713-715 (1984). 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1513 
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CIRAOLO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[February -, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a war-
rant from an altitude of 1000 feet of a fenced-in backyard 
within the curtilage of a home. 
I 
On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an 
anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in 
respondent's backyard. Police were unable to observe the 
contents of respondent's yard from ground level because of a 
6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclos-
ing the yard. Later that day, Officer Schutz, who was as-
signed to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over 
respondent's house at an altitude of 1000 feet, within naviga-
ble airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. 
Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From 
the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 
8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15 by 25 foot plot in 
respondent's yard; they photographed the area with a stand-
ard 35mm camera. 
On September 8, 1982, Officer Schutz obtained a search 
warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous 
tip and their observations; a photograph depicting respond-
ent's house, the backyard and neighboring homes was at-
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tached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The warrant was 
executed the next day and 73 plants were seized; it is not 
disputed that these were marijuana. 
After the trial court denied respondent's motion to sup-
press the evidence of the search, respondent pleaded guilty 
to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court 
of Appeal reversed, however, on the ground that the war-
rantless aerial observation of respondent's yard which led to 
the issuance of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 
That court held first that respondent's backyard marijuana 
garden was within the "curtilage" of his home, under Oliver 
v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1984). The court empha-
sized that the height and existence of the two fences consti-
tuted "objective criteria from which we may conclude he 
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by any stand-
ard." People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 
Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
Examining the particular method of surveillance under-
taken, the court then found it "significant" that the flyover 
"was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any 
other legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, 
but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this 
particular enclosure within [respondent's] curtilage." Ibid. 
It held this focused observation was "a direct and unau-
thorized intrusion into the sanctity of the home" which vio-
lated respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy. !d., at 
1089-1090, 208 Cal. Rptr., at 98 (footnote omitted). The 
California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for 
review. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari, -- U. S. 
-- (1985). We reverse. 
The State argues that respondent has "knowingly exposed" 
his backyard to aerial observation, because all that was seen 
was visible to the naked eye from any aircraft flying over-
head. The State analogizes its mode of observation to a 
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knothole or opening in a fence: if there is an opening, the po-
lice may look. 
The California Court of Appeal, as we noted earlier, ac-
cepted the analysis that unlike the casual observation of a pri-
vate person flying overhead, this flight was focused specifi-
cally on a small suburban yard, and was not the result of any 
routine patrol overflight. Respondent contends he has done 
·an that can reasonably be expected to tell the world he 
wishes to maintain the privacy of his garden within the curti-
lage without covering his yard. Such covering, he argues 
would defeat its purpose as an outside living area; he asserts 
he has not "knowingly" exposed himself to aerial views. 
II 
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether 
a person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expec-
tation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz posits a two-part 
inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? 
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable? See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 
(1979). 
Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met the 
test of manifesting his subjective intent to maintain privacy 
as to his challenged agricultural pursuits. However, we 
need not address that issue, for the State has not challenged 
the finding of the California Court of Appeal that respondent 
had such an expectation. It can reasonably be assumed that 
the 10 foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop 
from at least street level views. So far as the normal side-
walk traffic was concerned, this fence served that purpose, 
because respondent "took normal precautions to maintain his 
privacy." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 105 (1980). 
Yet a 10 foot fence might not shield these plants from the 
eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck 
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or a two level bus. Whether respondent therefore mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observa-
tions of his backyard, or whether he instead manifested 
merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gar-
dening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances. 
Respondent appears to challenge the authority of govern-
ment to observe his activity from any vantage point or place 
if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, 
and not the result of a casual, accidental observation. 
We turn, therefore, to the second inquiry under Katz, i. e., 
whether that expectation is reasonable. In pursuing this in-
quiry, we must keep in mind that "[t]he test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'pri-
vate' activity," but instead "whether the government's intru-
sion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected 
by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, -- U. S., at --. 
Respondent argues that because his yard was in the curti-
lage of his home, no governmental aerial observation is per-
m~ the Fourth Amendment without a warrant. 1 
The history and genesis of the curtilage doctrine is instruc-
tive. "At common law, the curtilage is the area to which ex-
tends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life."' Oliver, id., at--
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The protection af-
forded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and 
personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, 
both physically and psychologically, where privacy expecta-
' Because the parties framed the issue in the California courts below and 
in this Court as concerning only the reasonableness of aerial observation 
generally, see Pet. for Cert. i, without raising any distinct issue as to the 
photograph attached as an exhibit to the affidavit in support of the search 
~ warrant, our analysis is similarly circumscribed. It was the officer's ob-
servation, not the photograph, that supported the warrs nt. Officer 
Schutz testified that the photograph did not identify the marijuana as such 
because it failed to reveal a "true representation" of the color of the plants: 
"you have to see it with the naked eye." App. 36. 
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tions are most heightened. The claimed area here was im-
mediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrouhded by a 
double fence. This close nexus to the home woul.9.Jl.ppear to 
encompass this small area within the curtilage. Ac'Cepting, 
as t'fieState does, that this yard an 1 s crop fall within the 
curtilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observa-
tion of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully op-
erating at an altitude of 1000 feet violates an expectation of 
privacy that is reasonable. 
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all 
police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforce-
ment officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an indi-
vidual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activ-
ities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage 
v point where he haS:right to be and which renders the activi-
ties clearly visible. E. g., United States v. Knotts, 460 
U. S. 276, 282 (1983). "What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U. S., at 351. 
The observations by Officers Schutz and Rodriquez in this 
case took place within public navigable airspace, see 49 
U. S. C. § 1304, in a physically nonintrusive manner; from 
this point they were able to observe plants readily discern-
able to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation 
from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the 
officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. 
~Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to 
provide a basis for a warnint. Any member of the public fly-
ing in this airspace who cared to glance down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed. On this record, we 
readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his gar-
den was protected from such observation is unreasonable. 2 
2 The California Court of Appeal recognized that police have the right to 
use navigable airspace, but made a pointed distinction between police air-
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The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police 
traveling in the public airways to obtain a warrant in order to 
observe what lies below. 3 
Reversed. 
craft focusing on a particular home and police aircraft engaged in a "routine 
patrol." It concluded that the officers' "focused" observations violated re-
spondent's reasonable expectations of privacy. In short, that court con-
cluded that a regular police patrol plane identifying respondent's marijuana 
would lead to a different result. Whether this is a rational distinction is 
hardly relevant, although we find difficulty understanding exactly how re-
spondent's expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ 
when two airplanes pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for differ-
ent purposes. We are cited to no authority for this novel analysis or the 
conclusion it begat. The fact that a ground-level observation by police "fo-
cused" on a particular place is not different from a "focused" aerial observa-
tion under the Fourth Amendment. 
3 In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1986), decided 
today, we hold that the use of an aerial mapping camera to photograph an 
industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace similarly does 
not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The State acknowl-
edges that "(a]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either 
due to physical intrusiveness or through modem technology which dis-
closes to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities other-
wise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens." Brief for Petitioner 14-15. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a war-
rant from an altitude of 1000 feet of a fenced-in backyard 
within the curtilage of a home. 
I 
On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an 
anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in 
respondent's backyard. Police were unable to observe the 
contents of respondent's yard from ground level because of a 
6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclos-
ing the yard. Later that day, Officer Schutz, who was as-
signed to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over 
respondent's house at an altitude of 1000 feet, within naviga-
ble airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. 
Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From 
the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 
8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15 by 25 foot plot in 
respondent's yard; they photographed the area with a stand-
ard 35mm camera. 
On September 8, 1982, Officer Schutz obtained a search 
warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous 
tip and their observations; a photograph depicting respond-
ent's house, the backyard and neighboring homes was at-
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tached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The warrant was 
executed the next day and 73 plants were seized; it is not 
disputed that these were marijuana. 
After the trial court denied respondent's motion to sup-
press the evidence of the search, respondent pleaded guilty 
to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court 
of Appeal reversed, however, on the ground that the war-
rantless aerial observation of respondent's yard which led to 
the issuance of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 
That court held first that respondent's backyard marijuana 
garden was within the "curtilage" of his home, under Oliver 
v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1984). The court empha-
sized that the height and existence of the two fences consti_-
tuted "objective criteria from which we may conclude he 
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by any stand-
ard." People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 
Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
Examining the particular method of surveillance under-
taken, the court then found it "significant" that the fiyover 
"was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any 
other legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, 
but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this 
particular enclosure within [respondent's] curtilage." Ibid. 
It held this focused observation was "a direct and unau-
thorized intrusion into the sanctity of the home" which vio-
lated respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy. I d., at 
1089-1090, 208 Cal. Rptr., at 98 (footnote omitted). The 
California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for 
review. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari, -- U. S. 
-- (1985). We reverse. 
The State argues that respondent has "knowingly exposed" 
his backyard to aerial observation, because all that was seen 
was visible to the naked eye from any aircraft flying over-
head. The State analogizes its mode of observation to a 
84 - 1513-0PINIO.:\ 
CALIFORNIA t·. CIRAOLO 3 
knothole or opening in a fence: if there is an opening, the po-
lice may look. 
The California Court of Appeal, as we noted earlier, ac-
cepted the analysis that unlike the casual observation of a pri-
vate person flying overhead, this flight was focused specifi-
cally on a small suburban yard, and was not the result of any 
routine patrol overflight. Respondent contends he has done 
all that can reasonably be expected to tell the world he 
wishes to maintain the privacy of his garden within the curti-
lage without covering his yard. Such covering, he argues 
would defeat its purpose as an outside living area; he asserts 
he has not "knowingly" exposed himself to aerial views. 
II 
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether 
a person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable 'expec-
tation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz posits a two-part 
inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? 
Second, is society ·willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable? See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 
(1979). 
Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met the 
test of manifesting his subjective intent to maintain privacy 
as to his challenged agricultural pursuits. However, we 
need not address that issue, for the State has not challenged 
the finding of the California Court of Appeal that respondent 
had such an expectation. It can reasonably be assumed that 
the 10 foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop 
from at least street level views. So far as the normal side-
walk traffic was concerned, this fence served that purpose, 
because respondent "took normal precautions to maintain his 
privacy." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 105 (1980). 
Yet a 10 foot fence might not shield these plants from the 
eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck 
' . 
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or a two level bus. Whether respondent therefore mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observa-
tions of his backyard, or whether he instead manifested 
merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gar-
dening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances. 
Respondent appears to challenge the authority of govern-
ment to observe his activity from any vantage point or place 
if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, 
and not the result of a casual, accidental observation. 
We turn, therefore, to the second inquiry under Katz, i. e., 
whether that expectation is reasonable. In pursuing this in-
quiry, we must keep in mind that "[t]he test of legitimacy is 
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'pri-
vate' activity," but instead "whether the government's intru-
sion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected 
by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver,-- U. S., at--. 
Respondent argues that because his yard was in the curti-
lage of his home, no governmental aerial observation is per-
missible under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant. 1 
The history and genesis of the curtilage doctrine is instruc-
tive. "At common law, the curtilage is the area to which ex-
tends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life.'" Oliver, id., at --
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The protection af-
forded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and 
personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, 
both physically and psychologically, where privacy expecta-
' Because the parties framed the issue in the California courts below and 
in this Court as concerning only the reasonableness of aerial observation 
generally, see Pet. for Cert. i, Vl'ithout raising any distinct issue as to the 
photograph attached as an exhibit to the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant, our analysis is similarly circumscribed. It was the officer's ob-
servation, not the photograph, that supported the warrant. Officer 
Schutz testified that the photograph did not identify the marijuana as such 
because it failed to reYeal a "true representation" of the color of the plants: 
"you have to see it Vlith the naked eye." App. 36. 
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tions are most heightened. The claimed area here was im-
mediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrounded by a 
double fence. This close nexus to the home would appear to 
encompass this small area within the curtilage. Accepting, 
as the State does, that this yard and its crop fall within the 
curtilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observa-
tion of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully op-
erating at an altitude of 1000 feet violates an expectation of 
privacy that is reasonable. 
That the area is v.rithin the curtilage does not itself bar all 
police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforce-
ment officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an indi-
vidual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activ-
ities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage 
point where he has a right to be and which renders the activi-
ties clearly visible. E. g., United States v. Knotts, 460 
U. S. 276, 282 (1983). "What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U. S., at 351. 
The observations by Officers Schutz and Rodriquez in this 
case took place within public navigable airspace, see 49 
U. S. C. § 1304, in a physically nonintrusive manner; from 
this point they were able to observe plants readily discern-
able to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation 
from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the 
officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. 
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to 
provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of the public fly-
ing in this airspace who cared to glance down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed. On this record, we 
readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his gar-
den was protected from such observation is unreasonable. 2 
2 The California Court of Appeal recognized that police have the right to 
use navigable airspace, but made a pointed distinction between police air-
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The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police 
l traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. 3 
Reversed. 
craft focusing on a particular home and police aircraft engaged in a "routine 
patrol." It concluded that the officers' "focused" observations violated re-
spondent's reasonable expectations of privacy. In short, that court con-
cluded that a regular police patrol plane identifying respondent's marijuana 
would lead to a different result. Whether this is a rational distinction is 
hardly relevant, although we find difficulty understanding exactly how re-
spondent's expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ 
when two airplanes pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for differ-
ent purposes. We are cited to no authority for this novel analysis or the 
conclusion it begat. The fact that a ground-level observation by police "fo-
cused" on a particular place is not different from a "focused" aerial observa-
tion under the Fourth Amendment. 
3 In Dow Chemical Co . v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1986), decided 
today, we hold that the use of an aerial mapping camera to photograph an 
industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace similarly does 
not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The State acknowl-
edges that "[a]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either 
due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which dis-
closes to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities other-
wise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens." Brief for Petitioner 14-15. 
( 
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CAUFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[May -, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a war-
rant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard 
within the curtilage of a home. 
I 
On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an 
anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in 
respondent's backyard. Police were unable to observe the 
contents of respondent's yard from ground level because 
of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely 
enclosing the yard. Later that day, Officer Schutz, who was 
assigned to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over 
respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navi-
gable airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. 
Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From 
the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 
8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15-by-25 foot plot 
in respondent's yard; they photographed the area with a 
standard 35mm camera. 
On September 8, 1982, Officer Schutz obtained a search 
warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous 
tip and their observations; a photograph depicting respond-
ent's house, the backyard, and neighboring homes was 
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attached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The warrant was 
executed the next day and 73 plants were seized; it is not 
disputed that these were marijuana. 
After the trial court denied respondent's motion to sup-
press the evidence of the search, respondent pleaded guilty 
to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court 
of Appeal reversed; however, on the ground that the war-
rantless aerial observation of respondent's yard which led to 
the issuance of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 
161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984). That court 
held first that respondent's backyard marijuana garden was 
within the "curtilage" of his home, under Oliver v. United 
States, 471 U. S. 170 (1984). The court emphasized that the 
he~ght and existence of the two fences constituted "objective 
criteria from which we may conclude he manifested a reason-
able expectation of privacy by any standard." 161 Cal. App. 
3d, at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr., at 97. 
Examining the particular method of surveillance under-
taken, the court then found it "significant" that the flyover 
"was not the resultv of a routine patrol conducted for any 
other legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, 
but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this 
particular enclosure within [respondent's] curtilage." Ibid. 
It held this focused observation was "a direct and unau-
thorized intrusion into the sanctity of the home" which 
violated respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy. 
/d., at 1089-1090, 208 Cal. Rptr., at 98 (footnote omitted). 
The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for 
review. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 471 U. S. 
-- (1985). We reverse. 
The State argues that respondent has "knowingly exposed" 
his backyard to aerial observation, because all that was seen 
was visible to the naked eye from any aircraft flying over-
head. The State analogizes its mode of observation to a 
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knothole or opening in a fence: if there is an opening, the 
police may look. 
The California Court of Appeal, as we noted earlier, 
accepted the analysis that unlike the casual observation of a 
private person flying overhead, this flight was focused 
specifically on a small suburban yard, and was not the result 
of any routine patrol .overflight. Respondent contends he 
has done all that can reasonably be expected to tell the world 
he wishes to maintain the privacy of his garden within the 
curtilage without covering his yard. 3uch covering, he 
argues would defeat its purpose as an outside living area; he 
asserts he has not "knowingly" exposed himself to aerial 
views. 
II 
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether 
a person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expec-
tation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz posits a two-part 
inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? 
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable? See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 
(1979). 
. Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met the 
I test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits. 
However, we need not address that issue, for the State has 
not challenged the finding of the California Court of Appeal 
that respondent had such an expectation. It can reasonably 
be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the 
marijuana crop from at least street level views. So far as 
the normal sidewalk traffic was concerned, this fence served 
that purpose, because respondent "took normal precautions 
to maintain his privacy." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 
98, 105 (1980). 
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Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the 
eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck 
or a 2-level bus. Whether respondent therefore manifested 
a subjective expectation of privacy from aU observations 
of his backyard, or .whether instead he manifested merely a 
hope that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pur-
suits, is not entirely-cl~ar in these circumstances. Respond-
ent appears to challenge the authority of government to 
observe his activity from any vantage point or place if the 
viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not 
the result of a casual, accidental observation. 
We turn, therefore, to the second inquiry under Katz, i. e., 
whether that expectation is reasonable. In pursuing this 
inquiry, we must keep in mind that "[t]he test of legitimacy 
is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 
'private' activity," but instead "whether the government's 
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values 
protected by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, supra, at 
181-:-183. 
Respondent argues that because his yard was in the curti-
lage of his home, no governmental aerial observation is 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment without a war-
rant. 1 The history and genesis of the curtilage doctrine is 
instructive. "At common law, the curtilage is the area to 
which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanc-
tity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' Oliver, 
supra, at 80 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886)). See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The 
' Because the parties framed the issue in the California courts below and 
in this Court as concerning only the reasonableness of aerial observation 
generally, see Pet. for Cert. i, without raising any distinct issue as 
to the photograph attached as an exhibit to the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant, our analysis is similarly circumscribed. It was the 
officer's observation, not the photograph, that supported the warrant. 
Officer Schutz testified that the photograph did not identify the marijuana 
as such because it failed to reveal a "true representation" of the color of the 
plants: "you have to see it with the naked eye." App. 36. 
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protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of 
families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to 
the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy 
-expectations are most heightened. The claimed area here 
I
. was immediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrounded 
by high double fences. This close nexus to the home would 
appear to encompass this small area within the curtilage. 
Accepting, as the State does, that this yard and its crop fall 
within the curtilage, "the question remains whether naked-
eye observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft 
lawfully operating at an altitude of 1 '000 feet violates an 
expectation of privacy that is reasonable. 
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all 
police observation. The FourU1 Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforce-
ment officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an indi-
vidual has taken measures to restrict some views of his 
activities preclude an officer's observations from a public van-
tage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly vistole. E. g., United States v. Knotts, 460 
U. S. 276, 282 (1983). "What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, supra, at 351. 
The observations by Officers Schutz and Rodriquez in this 
case took place within public navigable airspace, see 49 
U. S. C. § 1304, in a physically nonintrusive manner; from 
this point they were able to observe plants readily discern-
able to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation 
from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the 
officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. 
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to 
provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of the public 
J flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed. On this record, 
we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his 
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garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable 
and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor. 2 
The dissent contends that the Court ignores Justice 
Harlan's warning in his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 361-362 (1967), that the Fourth Amendment 
should not be limited to proscribing only physical intrusions 
onto private property .. Post, at--. But Justice Harlan's 
observations about future electronic developments and the 
potential for electronic interference with private communica-
tions, see Katz, supra, at 362, were plainly not aimed at 
simple visual observations from a public place. Indeed, 
since Katz the Court has required warrants for electronic 
surveillance aimed at intercepting private conversations. 
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 (1972). 
Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he was resting on 
the reality that one who enters a telephone booth is entitled 
to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. 
This does not translate readily into a rule of constitutional 
dimensions that one-"who grows illicit drugs in his backyard 
is "entitled to assume" his unlawful conduct will not be ob-
served by a passing aircraft-or by a power company repair 
2 The California Court of Appeal recognized that police have the right to 
use navigable airspace, but made a pointed distinction between police air-
craft focusing on a particular home and police aircraft engaged in a "routine 
patrol." It concluded that the officers' "focused" observations violated 
respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy. In short, that court con-
cluded that a regular police patrol plane identifying respondent's marijuana 
would lead to a different result. Whether this is a rational distinction 
is hardly relevant, although we find difficulty understanding exactly how 
respondent's expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ 
when two airplanes pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for differ-
ent purposes. We are cited to no authority for this novel analysis or the 
conclusion it begat. The fact that a ground-level observation by police 
"focused" on a particular place is not different from a "focused" aerial 
observation under the Fourth Amendment. 
.. 
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mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard. As Justice Harlan 
emphasized, 
"a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he 
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements 
that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself 
has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations 
in the open would not be protected against being over-
heard, for the expectation of privacy under the circum-
stances would be unreasonable." Katz, supra, at 361. 
One can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan con-
sidered an aircraft within the category of future "electronic" 
developments that could stealthily intrude upon an individ-
ual's privacy. In li.Il age where private and commercial flight 
in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for re-
spondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitu-
tionally protected from being observed with the naked eye 
from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment sim-
ply does not require the police traveling in the public airways 
at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what 
is visible to the naked eye. 3 
Reversed. 
a In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,- U. S.- (1986), decided 
today, we hold that the use of an aerial mapping camera to photograph an 
industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace similarly does 
not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The State acknowl-
edges that "[a]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either 
due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which dis-
closes to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities 
otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens." Brief for Petitioner 
14- 15. 
